24 January 2008 - Afternoon session
5 (2.00 pm)
6 (Jury present)
7 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Hough, I think unusually we
8 have Dr Martino on the videolink in Germany, but the
9 interpreter is here. So the first step is for the
10 interpreter to please be asked to be sworn.
11 (Interpreter affirmed)
12 THE INTERPRETER: The language is French.
13 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you very much. I call,
14 then, Dr Martino. Could you introduce us to him over
15 the videolink? I am the Coroner, and the person who
16 will be asking the questions is Mr Hough on my behalf.
17 MR HOUGH: Could we check that Dr Martino can hear us? It
18 may be that he can hear us but we can't hear him.
19 Dr Martino, borrowing from my learned friend
20 Mr Croxford, if you can hear us, could you raise your
21 hand? Dr Martino, I apologise, but we cannot, at this
22 stage, hear you. Some changes are being made to allow
23 that to be possible. (Pause)
24 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: The picture is very good!
25 MR HOUGH: Yes, I don't fancy doing this by gesture.
110
1 I think that has resolved the problem.
2 Is your name Dr Jean Marc Martino?
3 THE WITNESS: Yes.
4 MR HOUGH: Could the witness take an oath or make
5 an affirmation?
6 DR JEAN MARC MARTINO (affirmed)
7 Evidence via videolink (interpreted)
8 Questions from MR HOUGH
9 MR HOUGH: Dr Martino, I think you are a medical doctor,
10 a specialist in anaesthesia and resuscitation?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I think on the night of 30th and 31st August 1997, you
13 were working as a duty doctor for Paris SAMU?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. On that night you were stationed in the SAMU despatch
16 ward at the Necker Hospital in Paris?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. I think on 12th March 1998 you were interviewed by the
19 French police, a Major Crosnier; is that right?
20 A. 1998, possibly.
21 Q. Yes, that's tab 23, sir.
22 I think you also made a statement to experts for the
23 French court, Professors Lienhart and Lecomte in
24 October 1998?
25 A. Yes, and it was heard by the experts.
111
1 Q. It's tab 30, pages 18 and following.
2 You were also finally interviewed by a French
3 officer in the presence of two British police officers
4 in May of 2000, were you not?
5 A. That was in the year 2004.
6 Q. In fact, it's a mistranslation in the document we have.
7 I think it was 2005; is that right?
8 A. It might have been an error, but on the documents that
9 I have before me it says the year "2004".
10 Q. Do you have in front of you, then, the two witness
11 statements and the report of the French experts?
12 A. No.
13 Q. Do you have to hand or have you received recently some
14 other contemporaneous documents from that night?
15 A. The Coroner's office sent me some documents by e-mail.
16 Q. Do you have those printed off to hand?
17 A. No, they are not before me. I have them at home on
18 a USB device.
19 Q. It may be that we can simply go through them by
20 reference. The documents I think are first of all
21 an observation sheet from your ambulance; do you
22 remember that?
23 A. I have this one here.
24 Q. Good. Have you also been sent a summary record sheet
25 from the SAMU despatch ward, a document of two or three
112
1 pages?
2 A. Yes, I have it before me.
3 Q. Have you also been shown a copy of a document entitled
4 "Transcription de la bonde d'enregistrement"?
5 A. Yes, I have it before me.
6 Q. Do you also have a timeline prepared by Dr Lejay based
7 partly on that transcript?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Now, Dr Martino, I will try to limit the amount that we
10 go to the documents partly because we have heard them
11 referred to by Dr Lejay and Dr Derossi.
12 Turning first to your background, in your statements
13 you say that you qualified for the title of medical
14 doctor in 1991; is that right?
15 A. Exactly.
16 Q. I think you began active practice in 1991 and were
17 qualified to work for the Paris SAMU from 1992?
18 A. Exactly.
19 Q. Did you actually start working for SAMU in 1992?
20 A. In 1992, yes, that's right.
21 Q. So is it fair that you would have attended dozens or
22 perhaps hundreds of accidents by 1997?
23 A. I wouldn't say hundreds, but tens of accidents, I would
24 say.
25 Q. I think you qualified in surgical resuscitation
113
1 anaesthesia in 1996?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Now, in one of your interviews, you say you received
4 your "Diplome de docteur en medicine" in September 1997;
5 is that right?
6 A. Exactly.
7 Q. Can you explain the significance of that qualification
8 briefly?
9 A. The qualification as a doctor or as a specialist in
10 medicine?
11 Q. The diplome which you received in September 1997.
12 A. The reason why I passed that diplome in 1997 -- it's
13 a diplome that we receive at the end of our medical
14 studies and I didn't pass it in 1996 because I was doing
15 some research at that time.
16 Q. I see. Now, turning to the night of 30th and
17 31st August, I think your shift on that night was from
18 6 pm to 8 am?
19 A. Exactly.
20 Q. I think that the dispatcher or regulateur on duty was
21 Dr Derossi with Dr Lejay in reserve?
22 A. Both of them were on duty on that night.
23 Q. Now, we know from transcripts of calls and telephone
24 records that the first calls after the accident were
25 made at 00.23. We know from the SAMU transcript that
114
1 the first call to SAMU was at 00.26. I think you were
2 sent to the scene with ambulance Necker 02?
3 The witness is nodding.
4 Your driver was Michel Masseboeuf, whose evidence we
5 read by agreement, and you had a medical student with
6 you as well, I think?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. Your observation sheet indicates that you left the
9 hospital at 00.34 and arrived at the scene at 00.40?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. Does that then accord with your recollection, leaving
12 hospital within minutes of the first call and arriving
13 six minutes after departure?
14 A. Approximately, yes.
15 Q. In your statements you have said that when you arrived
16 at the scene, the pompiers were already there.
17 A. Exactly. That's correct.
18 Q. We have had evidence that two pompier vehicles arrived
19 at around 00.32.
20 A. That's correct, yes.
21 Q. You say in your statements that you noted the fatalities
22 and noted that two passengers were still in the crashed
23 Mercedes?
24 A. That's right.
25 Q. You say that you saw a female passenger whom you
115
1 recognised as the Princess of Wales?
2 A. That's right.
3 Q. You say that, when you first saw her, she was agitated
4 and crying out; is that right?
5 A. That's right.
6 Q. You also saw a front seat passenger who was a man?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. In your statement, you say that your initial assessment
9 was that he was more seriously injured?
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. You say that you asked your crew to attend to him while
12 you called for back-up?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. In the SAMU transcript -- this is page 1 for those
15 following -- there is recorded a report made to SAMU
16 from the scene at 00.40. That refers to being made by
17 your ambulance and there is a reference to
18 Princess Diana. There is a request for additional
19 units, but there is no mention of the injuries, the
20 specific injuries. Was that a report you made
21 personally or was that one of your crew?
22 A. You mean the first report that was sent to SAMU?
23 Q. Yes, at 00.40, the one I have just described.
24 A. No, it was -- the first call to ask for assistance and
25 additional help from the hospital was made by myself.
116
1 Q. Now, in your statement you say that shortly after you
2 arrived, a doctor from the pompiers arrived?
3 A. Yes, just after I arrived.
4 Q. You say that his crew attended to the male passenger,
5 leaving your crew to attend to the Princess?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. We know he is Dr Fuilla and he arrived at 00.43.
8 A. That's right.
9 Q. Now, you made an initial assessment of the Princess
10 while she was still trapped behind the front seat of the
11 car; is that right?
12 A. Yes, that's correct.
13 Q. In your statement, you say that you found her agitated
14 and her speech incoherent and confused?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. You say that she was moving her left arm, but her right
17 arm was bent behind and dislocated?
18 A. It was the left arm that she could move and the right
19 arm that was bent backwards.
20 Q. You say in your statements that you examined her while
21 she was trapped and you inserted an intravenous drip?
22 A. We did examine her while she was still in the car, but
23 we didn't give her an injection. It was a drip that was
24 inserted in her wrist.
25 Q. I think we are speaking the same language in one sense.
117
1 Now, in your interview with the French experts, you
2 say that she had an obvious facial injury, a frontal
3 facial injury; is that right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You say that you said also to the French experts that
6 you thought she may have had all sorts of other internal
7 injuries, abdominal or thoracic?
8 A. That's correct, yes.
9 Q. And that that is why you applied the intravenous drip,
10 as a precaution?
11 A. That's correct.
12 Q. But the way you put it in your statement to the experts
13 suggest that you didn't know, when you first assessed
14 her, that she had an internal injury; is that right?
15 A. Initially there was no evidence that she had any
16 internal injuries.
17 Q. Could you have a look at the observation sheet, please,
18 if you have that in front of you?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Can you see there some entries under the words, "Cause
21 initiale"?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you see reference there to "thoracic trauma with
24 subcutaneous emphysema"?
25 A. Yes.
118
1 Q. You also, under that heading, give details of the
2 sedation, the removal of the Princess from the car and
3 blood pressure?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. So is it right to say that all these entries were made
6 after you had been treating her?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. So when you refer there to thoracic trauma as "cause
9 initiale", you are saying that that was the immediate
10 cause of death -- cause of injury -- as you later found
11 out?
12 A. There is a chronology at the top of the page, and my
13 observations, my report, doesn't exactly follow that
14 chronology or the pages -- the numbers on the pages.
15 Q. We will follow that through. At 00.43 on the SAMU
16 transcript, there is a further report made by your
17 ambulance to an auxiliary at the SAMU ward.
18 A. What do you mean by an "auxiliary report"?
19 Q. No, to an auxiliary at the ward.
20 A. Do you mean that Dr Derossi prepared a report
21 afterwards?
22 Q. No. Do you have the transcript there in front of you?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Can you look on the second page please?
25 A. Yes.
119
1 Q. Halfway down the page, do you see a report from your
2 ambulance at 00.43? It's in the SAMU transcript.
3 A. (Pause). No, I am sorry, but I can't find it.
4 Q. Perhaps you can take it from me, Dr Martino, that there
5 is a report made by your ambulance at 00.43, a few
6 minutes after you had arrived, after the very first
7 report you made.
8 A. Yes, the first report was prepared by myself and was
9 sent by radio.
10 Q. Then after that very first report that we have heard
11 about, a few minutes later there was a second report.
12 It is on the transcript, but you may not remember making
13 it. It's page 2 of the transcript.
14 A. What I have before me is the first report at 00.43 that
15 was prepared by myself, and the second one was 00.50.
16 That was prepared by Dr Derossi when the reinforcement
17 or the help arrived.
18 Q. Can you see the one at 00.43?
19 A. Yes, it says something like "00.43".
20 Q. Yes. Do you see a reference there to "Two dead, a front
21 seat passenger having hit the windscreen and a rear
22 passenger with an arm injury"?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Was that report made by you?
25 A. Yes, that's correct.
120
1 Q. Was that an accurate account of what was then known?
2 A. Yes, that was my initial assessment, my first sight, my
3 first report.
4 Q. Now, Dr Derossi, I think, arrived at around 00.50,
5 according to the records?
6 A. It's possible.
7 Q. Did he, when he arrived, take over the job of reporting
8 from the scene?
9 A. Yes, afterwards it was him that prepared the reports.
10 Q. Did you make any reports after he arrived?
11 A. What do you mean by prepared other reports after --
12 Q. Did you make other reports to SAMU by radio?
13 A. Not through the radio, but through Dr Derossi.
14 Q. Now, I think under your direction, the time came when
15 the Princess of Wales was taken from the Mercedes on
16 an "olivier"?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. That's an olive tree board, for those of us in court.
19 That, according to the police transcripts, was at
20 fairly precisely 1 o'clock?
21 A. It's possible.
22 Q. So you had been on the scene for about 20 minutes when
23 she was removed from the Mercedes; is that right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. In your interview with the French experts, you describe
121
1 the treatment during that 20-minute period, and I will
2 now go through that.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You say that you and a colleague were in the car being
5 assisted by two pompiers outside.
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. You say that you applied the intravenous drip and gave
8 sedatives.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And those sedatives were given in order to allow the
11 Princess to be freed quickly from the car?
12 A. That's right.
13 Q. You say that you had to calculate the doses of the
14 sedatives based on her weight and clinical condition?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. You also say that you used an electrocardioscope and
17 a pressure cuff?
18 A. That's right.
19 Q. What was, briefly, the purpose of those?
20 A. Before moving any grievously harmed or grievously
21 injured person, the rules are that one has to check
22 first with -- to use the electrocardiogram and to
23 measure the blood pressure before moving the person.
24 Q. You also told the French experts that you checked oxygen
25 saturation with a pulse oximeter?
122
1 A. That's right.
2 Q. Why did you check that?
3 A. That is part of the initial standards when you are
4 examining an injured person.
5 Q. In your interview with the experts, you say that when
6 the Princess was removed from the Mercedes, she had no
7 pulse; is that right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Therefore you intubated her and you performed massage?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You say in your comments to the experts that she
12 regained a satisfactory heartbeat in a couple of
13 minutes; is that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. The police transcript indicates that the Princess of
16 Wales was in the ambulance by 18 minutes past 1.
17 A. That is fairly possible.
18 Q. But is it in fact likely that she was first put in the
19 ambulance a little before that?
20 A. I am afraid I won't be able to tell you that. Regarding
21 the timetable, I won't be able to tell you that.
22 Q. Perhaps you can help with this: was it just a few
23 minutes between when she came out of the Mercedes and
24 when she went into the ambulance?
25 A. After she was taken out of the car, we had -- where her
123
1 heart stopped beating, so we had to do all those -- try
2 to resuscitate her with massaging and everything, and
3 then once her heart started beating again, we covered
4 her and then we had to take her out of the tunnel
5 because my ambulance was at the other end of the tunnel.
6 Q. In your interview with the experts, you say that once
7 she was placed in the ambulance, her arterial pressure
8 dropped once again; is that right?
9 A. That's right, yes.
10 Q. You say that you prepared some dopamine, a drug which
11 increases, I think, heart rate and blood pressure?
12 A. That's correct, yes.
13 Q. You say that you then undressed her and performed
14 a detailed examination?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. You told the experts that at that stage she had
17 a right-hand side thoracic trauma which had not been
18 apparent previously with a subcutaneous emphysema?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. You say you then inserted two separate surgical lines,
21 one for dopamine and one for fluid to replace lost
22 blood?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now, at 01.19, Dr Derossi made a detailed situation
25 report.
124
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. So this was 20 minutes after the Princess had been
3 removed from the Mercedes?
4 A. It's possible, yes.
5 Q. Could you look at the SAMU transcript where that report
6 appears at page 3?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. If you can follow that with me. Dr Derossi said that
9 the patient had been intubated and ventilated?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. He said that she had cranial trauma, agitation and
12 confusion?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And he and Dr Lejay agreed that it was a case for the
15 neurosurgical unit at the Pitie-Salpetriere?
16 A. That's what we see on the report.
17 Q. He also referred to the sedatives?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now, he then said this:
20 "At first appearance, nothing to report for the
21 thorax."
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, we know that you had found a thoracic trauma when
24 you undressed the Princess?
25 A. That's right.
125
1 Q. So may we assume that Dr Derossi didn't know that when
2 he made this report?
3 A. This report that was made by Dr Derossi was whilst she
4 was still in the car, before they took her out of the
5 car and put her in the ambulance.
6 Q. No, Dr Martino, I have to correct you there. This
7 report was made 20 minutes after the Princess was
8 removed from the car.
9 A. Okay, then, Dr Derossi reiterated my initial report
10 because he didn't see what happened after she was taken
11 out of the car and resuscitated and put in the
12 ambulance.
13 Q. We see over the page that Dr Derossi reported that she
14 had a poor blood pressure.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. He said that you were re-inflating -- the word is
17 "regonfler" -- using a G-suit and catacholemines?
18 A. Yes, we have raised the blood pressure afterwards.
19 Q. At that stage he thought the ambulance might be ready to
20 go in a few minutes?
21 A. Apparently, yes, that's what it said.
22 Q. Is this right, that when he was making the report, you
23 were finding more serious injuries?
24 A. Yes. At that stage I examined the Princess and found
25 out that there were much more serious injuries.
126
1 Q. After that report, Dr Lejay made contact with
2 Professor Riou at the Pitie-Salpetriere.
3 A. It's possible.
4 Q. And Professor Riou, we know, accepted the Princess
5 at 01.25.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Could you repeat that, please?
7 MR HOUGH: Professor Riou accepted the Princess as a patient
8 at 01.25.
9 A. Yes. That's what we can see on the report.
10 Q. So is this fair, that she was accepted as a patient at
11 the Pitie-Salpetriere very quickly?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, moving on, we know that the ambulance departed
14 at 01.41.
15 A. Yes, possible.
16 Q. So there was 20 minutes between Dr Derossi's report and
17 the ambulance leaving?
18 A. Possibly, yes.
19 Q. Could you now look at the transcript at page 7 please?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Do you see there a report timed at 01.29?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Was it reported to SAMU that the blood pressure was
24 at 70?
25 A. Yes, that's right.
127
1 Q. So was that the same as 10 minutes previously?
2 A. Possibly. I will have to re-read these documents.
3 Q. It's page 4 of the report.
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. So is this right, that at 01.29 blood pressure was still
6 low?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, you told the French experts that you began the
9 journey to hospital as soon as arterial pressure was
10 restored.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. You say that you were aware of the importance of setting
13 off at the earliest possible opportunity?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. You were not waiting for hospital admission because the
16 patient had already been accepted at the hospital?
17 A. Would you like to repeat that?
18 Q. You were not waiting for hospital admission because the
19 patient had already been accepted at the hospital?
20 A. As a doctor in an ambulance, I cannot go anywhere
21 without having a final destination, and because of the
22 availabilities in certain hospitals, we have to know
23 where we are going before we can depart.
24 Q. We know in this case that the Princess had been given
25 her hospital destination at 01.25.
128
1 A. Indeed. If we did go at that time, then we must have
2 received where the destination -- the final destination.
3 Q. Is this right, that you were not aware of waiting for
4 hospital admission?
5 A. The procedures in SAMU are I cannot leave the scene of
6 the accident before I have had the destination from the
7 hospital.
8 Q. But in your comments to the French experts, you say that
9 you were waiting for the patient to stabilise and not
10 for some administrative arrangements.?
11 A. Yes and no. At the beginning, the conditions of the
12 Princess didn't allow us to move or didn't allow the
13 ambulance to move.
14 Q. This is important. We need to get this right. You told
15 the French experts that you set off as soon as the
16 patient was stable; that you were waiting for the
17 patient to stabilise. Is that right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now, it has been suggested by some that the Princess
20 could and should have been rushed to hospital sooner.
21 What is your answer to that?
22 A. That's the big question that's been asked. According to
23 the norms, medical norms in France, when we are in the
24 scene of the accident, we have to ensure that the state
25 of the patient or the condition of the patient is stable
129
1 before we can move them anywhere.
2 Q. So in the period between when the Princess was put into
3 the ambulance and when the ambulance set off, were all
4 your efforts dedicated to stabilising her blood
5 pressure?
6 A. Exactly.
7 Q. Now, when you set off to the hospital at 00.41, I think
8 you asked the driver of the ambulance to go slowly?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And that was to avoid jolts which might harm the
11 patient, was it?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Now, your ambulance arrived at the hospital at just
14 before 02.07?
15 A. Possibly, yes.
16 Q. I think for all that time that the ambulance was on the
17 road, you were in the back and busy with your patient?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. I think the ambulance had a motorcycle escort?
20 A. Yes, the French police were on motorbikes at the front
21 and there was an escort of cars at the back of the
22 ambulance as well.
23 Q. I think that the ambulance stopped once, just beyond the
24 Austerlitz Bridge, not far from the hospital?
25 A. Yes.
130
1 Q. In your interview with the French and British officers,
2 you give the reason for that?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You say that the arterial pressure of the Princess
5 dropped and you had the ambulance stopped in order to do
6 a proper examination?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, others may ask this question, so I shall: why did
9 you stop the vehicle rather than drive on the short
10 distance to the hospital?
11 A. Because we had to find out why there was such a drop in
12 the blood pressure and also we were afraid that would
13 consequently lead to a cardiac arrest, a heart arrest,
14 and it is very hard to resuscitate a patient in these
15 conditions whilst the ambulance is moving.
16 Q. Now, we have heard that in the French system of
17 emergency medicine, the aim is to stabilise the victim
18 at the scene.
19 A. Yes, that's correct.
20 Q. Setting aside arguments over which system may be better,
21 the French system or the English system, do you consider
22 you followed proper procedures that night?
23 A. Yes, I think so.
24 Q. Do you consider you gave appropriate care that night?
25 A. Yes, I think so.
131
1 Q. Over the years there have been allegations that there
2 were suspicious delays in taking the Princess to
3 hospital. You were responsible for her care?
4 A. Yes, I was in charge of the care from the moment we
5 arrived at the scene until we arrived at the hospital.
6 Q. Is there any truth in the suggestion that you
7 deliberately delayed taking her to hospital in order to
8 harm her?
9 A. That's certainly wrong. That's certainly untrue.
10 MR HOUGH: Thank you very much. Those are my questions.
11 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Mansfield?
12 Questions from MR MANSFIELD
13 MR MANSFIELD: Good afternoon. My name is Michael Mansfield
14 and I represent Mohamed Al Fayed. I have very few
15 questions. I will deal with them chronologically. I am
16 sorry that it's asking you to reflect over a long period
17 of time, 10 years.
18 When you first arrived at the scene, would you agree
19 that the nature of the scene itself gave rise to
20 an obvious assessment that there would be a need for the
21 following technical resources to deal with thoracic,
22 cardiac and abdominal injuries?
23 A. On the whole? Of all the people that were there?
24 Q. Sorry, I don't mean the people who were obviously dead;
25 from the two who were not obviously dead?
132
1 A. According to the procedures of hospitals, SAMU -- so
2 when we arrived to the scene, we have to evaluate or
3 assess whether there are dead people, and if there are
4 any surviving people, then we have to see whether they
5 necessitate any help, and depending on the seriousness
6 of their injuries, and also to assess whether we need
7 any further help or further assistance.
8 Q. Yes, I understand that assessment, but the question is
9 this, and it's based, the question I ask, on something
10 you told the meeting of the experts. May I just read
11 you one sentence from what you said to the experts?
12 "The suspicion of serious trauma injuries did not
13 come from her clinical condition, but from the state of
14 the vehicle and the condition of the other passengers."
15 Is it fair to say that that was an assessment that
16 you made almost as soon as you arrived?
17 A. The scene itself seemed that there would be potential
18 serious injuries. On my first evaluation, when I saw
19 Princess Diana, she didn't seem to be seriously injured
20 compared to the front right passenger.
21 Q. Well, I understand she may not have seemed as serious,
22 but it must have been clear at that stage, given the
23 force of impact, that there was a real risk that she had
24 serious internal injuries that you could not detect at
25 that point?
133
1 A. Possibly. As it is with all road accidents, many people
2 come out of it without any injuries and others suffer
3 very serious internal injuries. But in my first initial
4 quick evaluation, Princess Diana didn't seem, didn't
5 appear, to suffer from serious injuries.
6 Q. When do you say that you first assessed that she did
7 have serious, or the possibility of serious internal
8 injuries?
9 A. At the time when we were going to get her out of the
10 car.
11 Q. Did you, at that point, ensure that SAMU central
12 operator was contacted with the information that there
13 were possibly serious internal injuries?
14 A. At what time?
15 Q. At the moment when you first assessed there was a real
16 possibility of serious internal injuries, namely when
17 you were about or at the point of removing her,
18 Princess Diana, from the car.
19 A. No, at that time Dr Derossi had arrived at the scene and
20 he was dealing with the communications with the hospital
21 regulators, whereas myself, at that time, I was mainly
22 caring for the Princess.
23 Q. Dr Martino, I fully appreciate your concern for
24 Princess Diana rather than reporting. May I just
25 explain? The problem is there appears to be a report
134
1 missing or either not made at that time. So you
2 understand, there is no report between 12.40 and 1.20,
3 approximately.
4 A. Mm.
5 Q. Can you help? Possibly not.
6 A. When Dr Derossi arrived at the scene, he acted as
7 a pivot between myself, the police and the personalities
8 there present. I, myself, was concentrating on
9 providing a medical care and I didn't provide any
10 communication, any report, afterwards. You would have
11 to speak with Dr Derossi about that.
12 Q. All right. Yes, thank you. We have. Let us just move
13 on. The question of the patient and stability: what is
14 your definition of "stability"?
15 A. Blood pressure between 60 and -- a minimum of 70 to 80
16 units of arterial blood pressure and a heartbeat between
17 60 and 100.
18 Q. Now, for how long does that have to be maintained before
19 you move the patient even along the road?
20 A. Once all the parameters are restored and maintained for
21 three to five minutes and everything seems to be stable,
22 then I can give the order to move.
23 Q. Well, the stage comes when Princess Diana is removed
24 from the car, and you told the experts that it took less
25 than two minutes to restore those two features, namely
135
1 heartbeat and blood pressure.
2 THE INTERPRETER: Less than two minutes?
3 MR MANSFIELD: Less than two minutes.
4 A. Initially, yes.
5 Q. Initially, yes. I will come to the next stage. Did
6 you, at that point, wait three to five minutes before
7 taking her to the ambulance?
8 A. No, we put her in the ambulance straightaway.
9 Q. Exactly. Could you not have done that once in the
10 ambulance as well? All right, I will explain.
11 I will take it slowly. Under two minutes to
12 stabilise, you take her straight to the ambulance, along
13 the road to the ambulance, and you put her in the
14 ambulance.
15 A. Two minutes to resuscitate and then straightaway in the
16 ambulance.
17 Q. Two minutes to resuscitate and stabilise, otherwise you
18 would not have moved her?
19 A. Exactly.
20 Q. Right. I want to read you something from your
21 statement. I am sorry, I have forgotten whether you
22 actually have it there. It's the statement you made to
23 the juge on 12th March 1998. As you have not the
24 statement in front of you, I will read the paragraph so
25 you have the total context:
136
1 "She was stuck in a medically abnormal position
2 between the back of the right-hand passenger seat ..."
3 It would be easier for you if you have the French
4 version. I am reading from the paragraph "She was stuck
5 in a medically ..." It's on that page. Do you have it?
6 It would be easier actually if you, very kindly,
7 Mr Interpreter, could read the paragraph in French and
8 then I will ask the question.
9 (Paragraph read in French to the witness)
10 Thank you. So that here we can understand what you
11 have been told in French, I just want to read the last
12 two sentences so the jury follow the next question:
13 "Despite this, during the operation, she went into
14 cardiac arrest and I had to intubate and ventilate her
15 (and cardiac massage) in order to resuscitate her.
16 I placed her in my ambulance in order to carry out
17 a closer examination and to continue resuscitation
18 during the journey to the designated hospital."
19 Now, is that an accurate description of what you
20 intended and were permitted to do, to place her in the
21 ambulance in order to carry out a closer examination and
22 to continue resuscitation during the journey to the
23 designated hospital?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. I am sorry, I do not want a misunderstanding. What the
137
1 sentence in English might imply and what I want to ask
2 you about is whether there are circumstances when you
3 can, having got the person into the ambulance, in
4 a serious case, conduct stabilisation and examination
5 during the journey to the designated hospital?
6 A. Whilst on the road? Whilst driving, you mean?
7 Q. That's what your statement says, yes.
8 A. The first thing that has to be done mainly in a road
9 accident is to determine at the beginning whether there
10 are any thoracic traumas and whether there are any inner
11 injuries and to try to determine where they are and to
12 try to stabilise the patient before putting them in the
13 ambulance.
14 Q. Yes, but you had already put her in the ambulance,
15 having stabilised her out of the car; do you follow?
16 A. It wasn't stabilise the patient. It was resuscitate;
17 resuscitating the patient.
18 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Mansfield, we have really
19 reached the limit of the shorthand writers' time.
20 I have noticed it's an hour and a half now, and that is
21 really the outside limit.
22 MR MANSFIELD: I have not much more, but as you can see,
23 it's a little difficult. Perhaps I should break now.
24 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes. What about timetable from
25 now on?
138
1 MR MANSFIELD: May I just confer to see?
2 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes.
3 (Pause)
4 MR MANSFIELD: As I understand it, Commander Jephson is to
5 be recalled after this.
6 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes.
7 MR MANSFIELD: I have a little more for him, but I am not
8 sure about others. It may be difficult -- I am sorry to
9 say this -- about the officer who has been stood down
10 twice, unless we sit a little late.
11 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: There is a limit to how late we
12 can sit. We will just have to see how we go, but
13 I think the absolute limit is 5 o'clock.
14 MR MANSFIELD: I will endeavour to meet that.
15 (3.32 pm)
16 (A short break)
17 (3.48 pm)
18 (Jury present)
19 MR MANSFIELD: Just a couple more questions. It's the stage
20 we have reached where she is out of the car and,
21 stabilised and resuscitated in under two minutes, moved
22 to the ambulance. Once in the ambulance, her arterial
23 pressure dropped again, as it did when she was removed
24 from the car. On this occasion, can you help as to --
25 and I don't expect precise times -- roughly how long do
139
1 you recollect it took for her to have her heartbeat and
2 blood pressure restored?
3 A. It is very hard to tell how long it took. After
4 examining her, doing -- giving her the right medicine,
5 resuscitating her, it probably took up to 30 minutes,
6 but it's very hard to assess how long it took.
7 Q. I do appreciate, Doctor, it is difficult, but could you
8 exclude the question of examination? It's purely the
9 issue of resuscitation, stabilisation. Do you follow?
10 Just that. How long would it have taken to do that,
11 just that?
12 A. 30 minutes.
13 Q. Was anybody in the ambulance monitoring that process?
14 A. Myself and the student who was with me.
15 Q. At this distance of time, are you able to say that, for
16 example, it would have been impossible to move her
17 within five to 10 minutes of being placed in the
18 ambulance and for the processes of resuscitation and
19 stabilisation not to have taken as quick an effect as
20 they did once she was removed from the car?
21 A. You cannot eliminate the examination phase or the
22 assessment phase, which was a very -- the re-examination
23 phase, which was really important. We moved from
24 a first stage, where the patient is considered lightly
25 injured, and had a cardiac arrest while trying to move
140
1 her from the car, which is not normal. That's why in
2 certain -- the patient might have had certain injuries
3 that weren't clear, that weren't apparent, and it was
4 necessary to firstly try to find out what those injuries
5 were, and some of them can be treated quite quickly,
6 like haemorrhage, and others may take longer. That's
7 why it was necessary to do another examination just like
8 the one we conducted in the ambulance, where the patient
9 was undressed and a deeper examination was done.
10 Q. The final question: if this process cannot be done
11 during the journey to the designated hospital, why did
12 you say that it was, in relation to this case, in your
13 statement?
14 A. I missed the gist of the question.
15 Q. You had read in French to you the paragraph in your
16 statement which says, "I placed her in my ambulance in
17 order to carry out a closer examination and to continue
18 resuscitation during the journey to the designated
19 hospital". Why did you say that if, in fact, that's not
20 allowed?
21 A. What I cannot understand is what am I not supposed to be
22 doing.
23 MR MANSFIELD: I really don't want to take up too much time.
24 Sir, I think I have made the point. I am not going to
25 pursue it.
141
1 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you. Mr Weekes?
2 MR WEEKES: No, thank you, sir.
3 MR CROXFORD: No, thank you, sir.
4 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Macleod?
5 Questions from MR MACLEOD
6 MR MACLEOD: Dr Martino, my name is Duncan Macleod and I ask
7 questions on behalf of the Commissioner of London
8 Police.
9 First, I don't think you have told us what medical
10 position you currently hold.
11 A. Currently I work as a resuscitating doctor in a hospital
12 in Munich.
13 Q. Is that in the position of chef de clinique or
14 consultant?
15 A. No, that was in Paris.
16 Q. Turning to the events, I would like to isolate with you
17 the critical medical events that exercised your judgment
18 when you were treating the Princess. First of all, when
19 she was retrieved from the Mercedes, is it correct that
20 she was without a pulse and with no detectable arterial
21 blood pressure?
22 A. After removing her from the car.
23 Q. And that you needed to perform emergency life-saving
24 cardiac massage?
25 A. Exactly.
142
1 Q. In addition, you had to increase the volume replacement
2 to restore her arterial blood pressure?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. How long did those two procedures take?
5 A. It's very hard to assess the time. As I have stated on
6 many occasions in my statements, I did not have a watch
7 on me and it is the same debate that comes back again
8 and again.
9 Q. But once that pulse was restored and once the arterial
10 pressure had been restored, was it then, thereafter,
11 necessary to intubate and ventilate the patient?
12 A. According to the norms, yes, it was to intubate and ...
13 Q. And that was before the patient was taken into the
14 ambulance; is that right?
15 A. Exactly.
16 Q. That was to provide a secure airway to ensure that she
17 maintained her breathing?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Only thereafter was she taken to the ambulance and, once
20 there, her arterial blood pressure fell to a dangerously
21 low level; is that right?
22 A. Exactly.
23 Q. Would it have been safe to transport the patient at that
24 stage to hospital when she was in that precarious
25 condition?
143
1 A. No.
2 Q. Is the French system of emergency and accident care
3 based on the principle of getting the patient to
4 hospital in the best and most stable condition for
5 subsequent treatment?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Once the patient had been stabilised and began the
8 journey to the hospital, even at a very slow speed, is
9 it right that the patient again had a catastrophic or
10 near catastrophic fall in arterial blood pressure?
11 A. Exactly.
12 Q. And that required the ambulance to come to a complete
13 halt for further emergency treatment?
14 A. Yes, exactly.
15 Q. Is it right that the factor that dictated when the
16 ambulance left was the critically low blood pressure
17 which needed to be stabilised before the ambulance
18 moved?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Is it right that medically there is a world of
21 difference between stabilisation of a patient and
22 resuscitation?
23 A. Exactly. They are completely different.
24 Q. In relation to radio transmissions, do you recall that
25 later, once the first medical assessments had been made
144
1 by yourself and Dr Derossi, a decision was made not to
2 transmit further reports over the radio on grounds of
3 maintaining privacy?
4 A. If such a decision was taken, it was taken independently
5 of me because afterwards it was Dr Derossi that was
6 dealing with such -- with any transmission.
7 Q. Whilst the Princess was under your medical care, did you
8 take any step other than that which you considered to be
9 in the best interests of the patient?
10 A. What do you mean by that?
11 Q. There have been suggestions that there was a deliberate
12 delay in getting the Princess to hospital for surgery.
13 A. Everything that we have done was in the best interests
14 of the Princess. Nothing that we have done -- we
15 haven't deliberately delayed her departure to the
16 hospital.
17 Q. Did you do anything other than your best to try to save
18 the patient's life?
19 A. I did the best I could with the means that I had at the
20 scene of the accident.
21 MR MACLEOD: Thank you very much, Dr Martino.
22 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Hough?
23 MR HOUGH: Nothing from me, sir.
24 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you very much, Dr Martino.
25 That will be all we require and we are very grateful
145
1 indeed for you giving up your time and coming to help.
2 A. Not at all.
3 (The witness withdrew)
4 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you very much,
5 Mr Interpreter, as well.
6 Do we need to adjourn to change the screens or can
7 we continue with Mr Jephson without?
8 MR HOUGH: I think we can probably continue without.
9 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I will recall Mr Jephson then.
10 COMMANDER PATRICK JEPHSON (continued)
11 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes, Mr Mansfield.
12 Questions from MR MANSFIELD (continued)
13 MR MANSFIELD: Sorry, Commander, I am afraid there was
14 an interval of time.
15 Can I just recapitulate a moment? We had reached
16 chronologically 1993. I had dealt with 1992. 1993 were
17 the instances where I think you said you were only aware
18 later -- and the words you used a bit earlier today were
19 "through unofficial sources" -- that in that year a firm
20 in Brighton had come to sweep her premises under the
21 pretext of being carpet-fitters.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. What were the unofficial sources from which you learned
24 that this had happened?
25 A. I think it was another member of the domestic staff.
146
1 Q. Right. Now I am moving into 1994. Were you aware,
2 first of all, of the person who came in that year, and
3 his name, to do exactly the same; in other words sweep
4 the premises?
5 A. No.
6 Q. All right. Did Diana ever indicate to you that in fact
7 she did have particular sources that were
8 ex-intelligence?
9 A. She did once, yes.
10 Q. Can you help us as to when that was?
11 A. I am afraid I can't put a date to it, except it must
12 have been, I would think --
13 Q. In this period?
14 A. Yes, in that period.
15 Q. It seems to follow that -- you don't know the name and
16 presumably, then, you didn't know how many times in 1994
17 he visited the Palace in order to carry out this sweep?
18 A. No, I didn't know that.
19 Q. He has told us four occasions he went. We don't have
20 the precise dates and it may not matter at all. Did you
21 know, in October 1994, that Diana met with very senior
22 police officers who were reviewing the close protection
23 situation because it had been removed by then; do you
24 follow? Did you know that she had done that?
25 A. I don't recall. I don't remember, I am afraid, and
147
1 I don't think that it was a -- I don't think it was
2 something that we discussed at length. It certainly
3 didn't stick in my memory.
4 Q. No, there are reasons for asking you about this and
5 I will summarise it quickly because of the slight
6 pressure of time. When she went in October 1994, the
7 notes of the meeting that the officer kept in relation
8 to this suggest that there was a point in the meeting at
9 which she indicated that she was aware that her premises
10 and her vehicle were being monitored. Right? So you
11 didn't know she was telling the police that?
12 A. No, I didn't know that.
13 Q. Right. In a sense, her stating that is of no particular
14 surprise, given your advice and the points we have
15 already been through, is it?
16 A. No, it's not a surprise.
17 Q. Not a surprise. I just want to complete the picture.
18 It's more detailed than that, but I am doing it in brief
19 form. The police themselves said it wasn't them, all
20 right, during the time of the conversation. However,
21 they have agreed that the implication is it's someone
22 else. But the upshot was that they actually did nothing
23 about it. Did you know anything about that?
24 A. Not that I can recall, no.
25 Q. So you appreciate the position from the Princess's point
148
1 of view: through 1992, 1993, 1994, there are concerns,
2 and it would appear that no-one in authority, by which
3 I mean police or security services, appears to have
4 reported back to her; do you follow?
5 A. It would appear to be that, yes.
6 Q. If there had been a report back from any organisation
7 such as that, namely police, special branch, security
8 services, would you have thought you would have been
9 notified or know about it?
10 A. Hard to say. I was -- I took some care not to give the
11 Princess the impression that I was trampling on her
12 domestic arrangements.
13 Q. Very well. Yes, I understand. The final point on this
14 is, of course, that -- it's been touched on today;
15 "Mr Harding" is the name of the man who came four
16 times -- he, in fact, did get a signal that could have
17 been a device, and when he went back he didn't get the
18 signal a second time. You didn't know anything about
19 that?
20 A. No, I didn't know about that.
21 Q. All right. Can I pass into the following year, 1995?
22 Now, it would appear somewhere towards the end of this
23 year -- and I just want to deal, so you are clear what
24 the position is -- you provided information to the
25 police on a phone message about the Princess's concerns
149
1 connected to a homing or tracking device on the vehicle
2 and the question of the brakes being tampered with.
3 Now, you are quite clear that there was such a point in
4 1995 when the driver, Steve Davies, was asked to check
5 these matters?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Right. Again it may have an effect on her approach,
8 depending on what seems to have happened here. When
9 Mr Davies was first asked about that, namely your
10 recollection, he didn't say he couldn't remember; he
11 just said it was rubbish.
12 A. Well, my memory is quite clear and I couldn't explain
13 his reaction.
14 Q. No, no, I appreciate that. So on that basis, can I just
15 ask you: did you ask Mr Davies, "Look, I think you
16 should check", and then there is a report back from him?
17 Can you remember? Is that how it went?
18 A. It was, I think -- it would have appeared as almost
19 a casual remark, along the lines of "You have not
20 noticed any problems with the brakes, have you?",
21 and ...
22 Q. Well, I am just reading from the note --
23 A. Sorry, sir, what is this note?
24 Q. Perhaps, in fairness, I should read it to you. This is
25 a note that DCI Hodges made on 2nd November 2006. At
150
1 4 pm on that day he says he spoke to you because you had
2 phoned from the United States of America.
3 A. At his request, yes.
4 Q. Yes, that's right. He asked you if you could recall
5 anything in relation to the concerns that the Princess
6 of Wales expressed over her Audi, so it was a very
7 specific point being made to you, and you said,
8 according to the note that he took -- this was in late
9 1995, so it's the year I am asking you about.
10 "The Princess of Wales had two concerns. One, that
11 there was a homing device/tracking device fitted to the
12 Audi. Her royal driver at that time was Steve Davies,
13 who checked the car with her and did not find anything.
14 The Princess of Wales considered this to be
15 inconclusive."
16 Now, I pause there. There is one more paragraph.
17 So your recollection was clear that somebody had asked
18 Steve Davies to check the car, he had done so with her
19 and did not find anything; that was your recollection?
20 A. Well, my recollection is that I was the person who asked
21 Mr Davies --
22 Q. Right.
23 A. -- and it's quite possible that the Princess had also
24 asked him. I don't remember the exact sequence of the
25 conversations, I am afraid. It seems there was more
151
1 than one.
2 Q. You see, what may be the case is that he was asked and
3 he didn't bother with it; do you follow?
4 A. It's possible.
5 Q. Which is why he is now saying that it's all rubbish.
6 That's one explanation. Of course there are others.
7 Can I move to the second paragraph?
8 "During November/December 1995 [so you put a couple
9 of months on this one] the Princess of Wales stated that
10 she thought the brakes of her Audi had been tampered
11 with. Steve Davies again examined the vehicle's brake
12 system for any problems or sign of tampering. He found
13 no evidence of any defect or tampering. It should be
14 noted that Mr Davies also drove this vehicle regularly
15 and had no such concerns."
16 Then it goes on with "apartment being bugged" and so
17 on. Again, it's quite specific in terms of the time
18 period at least, November/December 1995, that the
19 complaint was made and Steve Davies again examining the
20 vehicle's brake system. So that's the note, all right?
21 A. Right.
22 Q. I am just trying to see what the pattern of response is
23 to her complaints; do you follow? So as far as you are
24 concerned, there was a complaint on both fronts,
25 tracking and brakes, and Steve Davies was asked to do
152
1 something about it, at least look at the car?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Right. Now I want to move on, although it's the same
4 year, just before November/December.
5 We then get the -- I will call it the
6 "Panorama/Bashir interview". First of all, did you
7 watch the interview even though she had not asked for
8 advice from you?
9 A. I watched a tape of it later on the evening on which it
10 was broadcast. I didn't watch it to the end.
11 Q. I will again do it quickly. First of all, it's
12 perfectly clear in that interview that she is expressing
13 very genuine feelings and concerns, isn't she, that she
14 had?
15 A. I couldn't comment about their genuineness.
16 Q. Well I am going to ask you to because you have made some
17 comments about this interview. This was an interview in
18 which she replicated, in other words she repeated, some
19 of the concerns that were in the book; do you agree?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. She is talking about her relationship with Charles, her
22 relationship with the Royal Family and how she felt
23 isolated.
24 A. Yes, she did.
25 Q. That was perfectly genuine and reasonable for her to
153
1 perceive it that way, wasn't it?
2 A. I would say it was, yes.
3 Q. What I want to do is, on the topics that she
4 discusses -- this is not -- it may be a woman who is
5 feeling angry, upset and so on, but what she is
6 portraying is quite genuine, isn't it?
7 A. I think so, yes.
8 Q. Yes, that's the point. Because she talks -- it may have
9 surprised some people -- quite openly about her own
10 problems, bulimia, on the programme; do you remember?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. She talks quite openly about other relationships and
13 liaisons that she has had and she names the people.
14 A. Yes, I remember that.
15 Q. She also talks about the capacity or ability of
16 Prince Charles to become the next king; she hopes not,
17 that there is a skip in generation and so on. She says
18 that on the programme.
19 A. Yes, I remember that.
20 Q. She also, perhaps more particularly, indicates that she
21 thinks she is seen as a "threat", doesn't she? That's
22 the very word she uses, isn't it?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And that is again perfectly justified given all the
25 things we have been through?
154
1 A. Yes, I would agree.
2 Q. She goes on to say that what the fear is, amongst those
3 who have this fear, the Royal Household -- it's in the
4 interview:
5 "Mr Bashir: You mean within the Royal Household?
6 "Answer: Aha, they see me as a threat of some kind
7 ..."
8 There is a bit more than that. I will complete the
9 sentence:
10 "... and I am here to do good. I am not
11 a destructive person.
12 "Mr Bashir: Why do they see you as a threat?
13 "Answer: I think every strong woman in history has
14 had to walk down a similar path and I think it's the
15 strength that causes the confusion and fear."
16 Do you remember that?
17 A. I don't remember those specific words, but the
18 sentiment, yes.
19 Q. Perfectly genuine sentiment, wasn't it?
20 A. I don't know. I mean I genuinely don't know. I think
21 that -- I am sure when she said it, she was quite
22 genuine in what she was trying to convey --
23 Q. Do you agree -- sorry, I do not want to interrupt.
24 A. No, it's okay.
25 Q. Do you agree that in fact one of the things she
155
1 displayed was remarkable courage and determination in
2 the end to do what she felt was right?
3 A. Yes. I have said as much.
4 Q. Yes, of course. One of the things she said just before
5 that passage in the interview was:
6 "I think the British people need someone in public
7 life to give affection, to make them feel important, to
8 support them, to give them light in their dark tunnels.
9 I see it as a possibly unique role and, yes, I have had
10 difficulties, as everybody has witnessed over the years,
11 but let's now use the knowledge I've gathered to help
12 other people in distress."
13 That was very typical of her feelings at the time,
14 wasn't it?
15 A. Yes, it was.
16 Q. That would not necessarily go down well with those in
17 the Royal Household who would be watching this, would
18 it?
19 A. I mean, that would be speculation and I wouldn't want to
20 speak on the Royal Household's behalf.
21 Q. Well, you do in your book, you see, make an assessment
22 because you really thought, did you not, that this
23 programme -- and I will put it in words you didn't use,
24 but hopefully this summarises it -- was a bridge too
25 far; she had gone too far with this?
156
1 A. In the sense, I didn't think there was any going back
2 from it.
3 Q. Yes, there was no going back. It had been broadcast to
4 the nation and other nations as well.
5 I just want to quote from page 372. You have the
6 actual hardback there, so it's a bit quicker. There is
7 a paragraph towards the end of your book. This is
8 after the programme has gone out and this is what you
9 say. May I just read the paragraph that has "Now it
10 seemed ..." Do you have that? It is up the top of that
11 page.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. "Now it seemed Nicholas Soames' view of her mental state
14 was widely shared in Palace circles."
15 First of all, that was the view that he expressed on
16 the discussion following the Bashir programme, wasn't
17 it?
18 A. Yes, it was.
19 Q. Basically accusing her of mental instability?
20 A. Yes, exactly.
21 Q. Now, "widely shared in palace circles" -- and please
22 understand I am not wishing to pick out names -- but
23 there are people you have in mind there, do you?
24 A. This was the mood that I picked up.
25 Q. Yes. By talking to people in those circles?
157
1 A. Yes. I think that people were puzzled, and one of the
2 explanations they found for themselves was that
3 therefore there must be a problem with the Princess's
4 mental capacity in some way.
5 Q. Yes, I appreciate. These are the same "they" that were
6 ruthless in defence of the Monarchy, as you put on
7 a previous page, is it?
8 A. Not necessarily.
9 Q. No, all right. I understand that. But some of them
10 are?
11 A. Yes. It's very difficult, when using a term like "the
12 Royal Household", to apply generalisations.
13 Q. No, I appreciate. Also I am not wanting to compromise
14 individuals, but there are plainly, in this category,
15 individuals that you have in mind as well as the general
16 observation.
17 A. Yes, yes, there are.
18 Q. You go on in this paragraph:
19 "As he had unwisely announced, to many she seemed to
20 be suffering from galloping paranoia. 'She really has
21 gone too far', confided one senior figure ..."
22 Again, I will not press you for names. The one
23 senior figure is not Soames, but someone else?
24 A. That's right, and in fact it's a senior figure who was
25 nevertheless not directly involved in any of these
158
1 events.
2 Q. Right.
3 A. That gave me the sense of how these events were being
4 perceived generally.
5 Q. "... as if brilliantly identifying the cause of all our
6 misery, his exasperation inadequately disguised as
7 sympathy. 'Tell me about it', I could have replied, or
8 rather, 'Please don't'. Instead I just nodded."
9 Of course, what you were getting at there was that
10 you yourself, by this stage, were becoming exasperated.
11 A. That was one of my feelings, certainly, yes.
12 Q. All right. Now, I want to move to a slightly later
13 time, and before I do, I want to deal, if I may, with
14 the "Mishcon note", as it has been called, and the
15 meeting that you had which was also in 1995.
16 You mentioned earlier today that you thought there
17 had been a police investigation into Camillagate; do you
18 remember?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Could I just ask you a little bit more? Firstly, was
21 there and who did it?
22 A. I couldn't state as a fact that there had been one, but
23 my recollection is that there had been some police
24 activity in relation to the source of the tapes.
25 Q. Can you identify the squad that may have done that?
159
1 A. No.
2 Q. All right. The Mishcon note. I think you have it
3 there. It may help to have it in front of you. There
4 are two stages to this. There is the meeting itself
5 when the note is recorded, and you have very fairly said
6 that you don't actually now -- I am not expecting you
7 to -- remember the details of what she actually said.
8 But the bit you do remember is the private word with
9 you; all right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. It's what he has recorded here, which I think you are
12 not taking issue with, that you "... surprisingly said
13 that he himself half-believed in the accuracy of what
14 the Princess had said about her risks".
15 Now, this would imply, would you agree, that you did
16 not say to him, "Well, actually we are having a word in
17 private. If you really want to know, she has said it
18 many times before. I have never found any evidence and
19 really this is of the same ilk"? You didn't put it that
20 way, did you?
21 A. I don't recall exactly. I am afraid I don't, no.
22 Q. All right. I will not press it. It's a long time ago.
23 You agree, the impression of the short note --
24 I accept it's a short note as far as you are
25 concerned -- is that he seems to be getting the
160
1 impression, that's why he uses the word "surprising",
2 that you were taking at least 50 per cent of it
3 seriously?
4 A. I thought that it was the sensible reply to give to the
5 Princess's lawyer. He had this information in
6 confidence from his client. Had I confirmed it outright
7 or had I denied it outright, then that would have,
8 I think, been to misrepresent my view at the time.
9 Q. You could have neither confirmed nor denied?
10 A. That's what I did, I hope. That was my intention.
11 Q. Well, it may have been, all right. I will accept what
12 your intention may have been. It may have been
13 misconstrued or not quite reflected in the note. But in
14 any event, the real question here is -- you see, at that
15 point, given everything we have been through, over the
16 1992 to 1995 period, in fact what she was saying, can
17 I put, it wasn't completely off the wall or off the
18 radar, was it?
19 A. No, and I think, as I said earlier, my main concern was
20 why she was so concerned as to make these remarks.
21 Q. Right.
22 A. Rather less than being distracted by the detail of them,
23 that what it was that she was trying to say. If these
24 events were not strictly accurate, which I didn't
25 believe them to be, then why was it that she was saying
161
1 these rather dire things?
2 Q. Just taking the question of the brakes and the car, it
3 may be that by this stage, given what may have been
4 found at the palace, given what is being said by you to
5 her about bugging or -- I put it in a general phrase --
6 at least monitoring of her calls -- Inspector Wharfe is
7 saying about monitoring of her calls; Mr Burrell is
8 saying exactly the same thing, so three of you all
9 saying that -- it's not particularly surprising that she
10 may have quite a genuine fear here, leaving aside any
11 other source of information?
12 A. Yes, I have said in my statement that I understood why
13 she might be in a defensive state of mind.
14 Q. Right. In fact the paragraph in your statement is over
15 the page. I am not asking you to look at it:
16 "The Princess was justified in thinking that her
17 future status and public role were in question. She
18 attracted hostile comment in some influential quarters
19 and knew that she was briefed against in the media."
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. So what remains here is in fact to try and get at the
22 root of this; in other words, what were the, as it says
23 in the note, "reliable sources" that she is mentioning
24 to her solicitor? Do you agree?
25 A. I know she mentioned it, but I didn't know what the
162
1 reliable sources were.
2 Q. No, no. You would only begin the process not on that
3 day, but on successive days after that day -- well,
4 I appreciate your relationship is coming to an end, but
5 it had not ended quite by this point. Did you ask her
6 after the meeting, "Well what are these reliable
7 sources?" Can you help us?
8 A. I do recall from time to time voicing my scepticism
9 about some of the fears that she was telling me about
10 and asking her if she had any concrete evidence, if she
11 was able to give me any indication as to the source of
12 the threats she felt she was under so that I could do
13 something about it, but she didn't.
14 Q. That's generally -- I am really trying to pinpoint and
15 focus this period of time.
16 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Jephson, would this be
17 an accurate assessment of what you are saying: that she
18 was a complex individual in a unique and difficult
19 situation and you didn't really know what was making her
20 say these things?
21 A. That's true, sir.
22 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well, I do not want to put words
23 into your mouth.
24 A. That is -- it was all those things, and until I knew
25 what was putting those thoughts in her mind, I was very
163
1 concerned not to set a lot of hares running until I had
2 something to back them up with.
3 MR MANSFIELD: Yes. I understand your position on that.
4 Anybody would want to know what lies behind the fears.
5 If there is something, then it needs to be acted on.
6 I have dealt with the previous years and I have
7 suggested to you that there has not been much action on
8 her fears when expressed to official, you know, police
9 and so on. But on this occasion she has gone to the
10 trouble, albeit it's in the context of a meeting about
11 other things as well -- and Lord Mishcon obviously felt
12 it was important enough to make a note. Did you know he
13 had made a note?
14 A. Yes, I did.
15 Q. You did. So you recognised that he recognised that this
16 was something that had to be approached seriously?
17 A. He certainly felt that he had to take a record of the
18 conversation.
19 Q. All right. So I am focusing on this period. So it's
20 the last few months of you working for her. During that
21 period of time, did you follow up this meeting with her?
22 A. I don't recall, I am afraid. It was a very busy period
23 with other things going on.
24 Q. You see, what you have put in your statement, you are
25 welcome to look at it:
164
1 "I felt it best to try and elicit the source of her
2 information in order to decide what credence it
3 deserved. However, in the time available, I wasn't able
4 to establish the source with any certainty and even
5 wondered if it existed at all."
6 Now the reason I am asking you the question is
7 because of that observation. Is the position that, in
8 the rush of activity that followed, you actually didn't
9 ask her any further questions?
10 A. I don't recall and I wouldn't have been deterred from
11 asking her, but it was certainly my experience that
12 broaching that sort of subject, you had to pick your
13 moment with some care. This was a time when I seem to
14 recall there were two overseas tours, a very busy
15 domestic programme, staff changes, and we were a very
16 small office.
17 Q. In fact one of the complaints was that your office was
18 being pared down and Prince Charles was --
19 A. It's an observation; a rueful one.
20 Q. Yes, all right. Is this fair to say? There is a real
21 possibility in this period, that is after this meeting
22 and before you finally resigning, because we have got
23 the Bashir programme in this period as well -- it comes
24 in November, just after the meeting -- that actually you
25 never did get around to actually asking her; is that
165
1 fair?
2 A. No, I am not saying that.
3 Q. No, I know you are not saying that, but is that fair?
4 A. No, I don't think it is. You suggest that I couldn't be
5 bothered or didn't think it was important --
6 Q. No, no, no, I didn't say that. I didn't say you
7 couldn't be bothered. I am just saying you just get
8 didn't get round to it, life was busy, you had a lot of
9 other things on your mind and you just didn't ask her;
10 is that fair?
11 A. I didn't think the moment -- I couldn't find
12 an appropriate moment. I didn't make an appropriate
13 moment.
14 Q. So that seems to be the position on that. Now, we move
15 on, if we may, because I want to ask you if you can help
16 us about a stage that comes even later:
17 20th December 2003. That's the date on your statement.
18 I want to ask you how this statement came about. The
19 inquests had not been opened at that point. You may
20 remember that. Do you remember the inquests were opened
21 formally in public in January 2004?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Who contacts you about this statement and the note?
24 A. I don't know which statement we are talking about, sir.
25 Q. Sorry, your witness statement for these proceedings,
166
1 dated 20th December 2003.
2 A. I don't remember.
3 Q. You see, the statement we have, the copy of it -- I am
4 sorry, I should have asked for the -- is the original
5 available? If it isn't, I will not take up time. We
6 have a typed copy and the only name that appears on it
7 at the end is yours.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. That's often the case. But I wondered if you
10 remembered -- you don't remember who contacted you, but
11 did you get a telephone call or a letter or what?
12 A. Telephone call, I think.
13 Q. Do you remember what you were being asked?
14 A. I was being asked to come into Scotland Yard to give
15 a statement.
16 Q. About?
17 A. I don't remember the specific reason. It was to do with
18 the death of the Princess.
19 Q. Yes. Were you told on the phone that it was to do with
20 a note of a meeting with the Princess?
21 A. I don't recall.
22 Q. When did you first discover that in fact what they
23 wanted you to do was to comment on concerns that had
24 been noted by Lord Mishcon?
25 A. When I arrived for the interview.
167
1 Q. Right. Who did the interview?
2 A. I don't remember his name, I am afraid.
3 Q. A senior officer?
4 A. Yes. Commander rank, I think.
5 Q. I wonder if you could just jog your memory a little.
6 A. I am sorry, my memory is very fallible on that, sir.
7 Q. Yes, we are all a bit susceptible to that. It is a
8 commander rank officer. Were there more than one?
9 A. There was one senior officer and I think a sergeant.
10 Q. Right. Did you dictate a statement which they then
11 wrote down or how did it work?
12 A. We -- I was interviewed and I was then told the sergeant
13 would write up my statement. I queried that and said
14 that I would rather write my own statement, and after
15 some discussion, I was given a computer terminal on
16 which to write my statement.
17 Q. All on the same day?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Right. Whilst you were talking and before you went to
20 the computer to do it yourself, did they keep notes of
21 what you were saying?
22 A. I don't know.
23 Q. Did it appear obvious that they were --
24 A. Yes. I recall that notes were being taken, but I was
25 quite clear that I wanted to make my own statement.
168
1 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well it would be likely that
2 notes would be taken if the sergeant was going to write
3 the statement.
4 MR MANSFIELD: Yes. He could hardly do it without, unless
5 there was a tape-recording obviously.
6 Just this: did anybody say whether this note had
7 been disclosed to anybody?
8 A. The Mishcon note?
9 Q. That's right.
10 A. I don't recall.
11 Q. For example, to the Coroner. Did they say that, "We are
12 doing this for the Coroner"?
13 A. I am afraid I couldn't be sure.
14 Q. Since that time -- I just do it for completeness -- have
15 you been asked to make any other statements or
16 observations or been interviewed at all?
17 A. No, no, I have not.
18 MR MANSFIELD: Thank you very much.
19 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Weekes?
20 MR WEEKES: No, thank you, sir.
21 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Croxford?
22 MR CROXFORD: I don't think I have, sir, thank you.
23 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Horwell?
24 Questions from MR HORWELL
25 MR HORWELL: My name is Richard Horwell. I appear on behalf
169
1 of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.
2 Not long. You have been asked about a number of
3 assumptions you have made, and at times you have been
4 asked to make assumptions based on those assumptions,
5 Mr Jephson.
6 Can I ask you to confirm, for what I hope is the
7 last time, please, that you know of no evidence that
8 Diana's calls were being monitored? It is
9 an assumption. You have told this court you thought
10 they might have been monitored.
11 A. I thought it was a sensible assumption given the
12 concerns she had raised with me, and I also knew that
13 certainly, on one occasion, one of the police officers
14 on royalty protection duty certainly had a list of calls
15 purported to have been made from the Princess's phone.
16 Q. But your evidence has been you thought they might have
17 been?
18 A. I never claimed I had any evidence for it. It was
19 a piece of advice.
20 Q. You have told us that one of your motives, perhaps your
21 principal motivation for telling her that, was that you
22 wanted her to be wary as to what she said on the
23 telephone, particularly following the Squidgygate
24 affair?
25 A. Yes. Yes, that is correct.
170
1 Q. Do you have your book? You do. Page 280, please. You
2 said this:
3 "The strength of the Princess's position received
4 an unforeseen boost with the extraordinary emergence of
5 the Camillagate tape in late January 1993. As with
6 Squidgygate, excited rumours multiplied about the source
7 of the recording. Rogue elements of the secret services
8 were popular suspects with the tabloids and the Princess
9 alike, but the truth was far more mundane. Analogue
10 phone technology in 1989, when the conversation had
11 taken place, provided amateur eavesdroppers with hours
12 of vicarious thrills as they listened into mobile calls.
13 Inevitably some of these people were tempted to sell the
14 results of their electronic bin scavenging to
15 unscrupulous newspapers."
16 Was that your belief at the time?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And the Camillagate tapes were very damaging to
19 Prince Charles.
20 A. I think they were, yes.
21 Q. At page 82 of your book, please -- you have been asked
22 about this passage already -- this is the passage in
23 which the subject of astrology was discussed between you
24 and the Princess:
25 "It also undermined her sense of the ridiculous.
171
1 'Do you know', she said to me one day in June 1992, 'my
2 astrologer says my husband will never be king'. That
3 may have been exactly what she wanted to hear at the
4 time, but it did not appear to alter her husband's daily
5 routine one jot. Yet she continued to heed her
6 astrologer's predictions, the more dire, the better,
7 particularly where the Prince was concerned. Sure
8 enough she was rewarded with regular forecasts of
9 helicopter crashes, skiing accidents and other
10 calamities that obstinately refused to befall him, much
11 to her relief I have no doubt."
12 Then to 287, please. The paragraph just above the
13 halfway line:
14 "Her quest for personal growth took her into a whole
15 range of areas including astrology, reflexology, colonic
16 irrigation, massage, fitness training, soothsaying and
17 psychoanalysis. Advice of wildly differing quality
18 poured in. She was unrestrained in her appetite for it.
19 Apart from her children and her public duties,
20 I sometimes felt it took up the rest of her life.
21 "I am sure that in isolation many of the
22 practitioners she consulted were sources of
23 professional, honourable and valid advice, but in
24 combination they represented a bewildering cocktail of
25 emotional stimuli which robbed her of equilibrium at
172
1 times of stress and dissipated her powers of
2 concentration. They fed the paranoia that never lurked
3 far below the well-groomed surface and they provided as
4 many opportunities for mischief as for wholesome
5 thoughts and actions."
6 I am going to come back to those passages in
7 a moment, Mr Jephson. A final extract from the book,
8 please, page 371. It's towards the bottom of that page.
9 This is a bugging story.
10 "On one occasion, after yet another bugging story,
11 I expressed my polite mystification -- exasperation
12 would have been nearer the mark -- that none of these
13 hidden microphones had actually been discovered. 'Come
14 with me', she said."
15 If I can summarise, she took you to a room, pulled
16 up a stretch of carpet, put a finger to her lips.
17 "... she motioned me to look at the floorboards.
18 They had been recently disturbed. She pointed silently
19 at the sawdust ...
20 "I said nothing until we were back downstairs.
21 'Ma'am, you know that's just where they've been
22 rewiring?' It was true. In a colossal undertaking
23 after the Windsor fire, huge amounts were being spent on
24 upgrading of all the Palaces' electrics. She did not
25 seem to hear me. Her look was enough. By then I knew
173
1 when to make my exit from such conversations."
2 Now, with those passages in mind and the evidence
3 that you have given, you may appreciate that on
4 occasions attempts have been made to place weight on
5 what Diana had to say because she is reported to have
6 made certain claims on the basis of sources which she
7 refused to identify and it's that issue of her sources
8 that I want to ask you about.
9 As these inquests have progressed, we have been able
10 to identify some of those sources. We now know that it
11 was Rita Rogers who put in her mind the fear that the
12 brakes on her car would be interfered with;
13 Grahame Harding she described as a reliable MI6 source,
14 and we have heard from him that he has never worked for
15 the security services.
16 From your book, it is clear in that passage I have
17 just read that her source for her statement that
18 Prince Charles would never be king was her astrologer;
19 is that right?
20 A. Yes, I would agree.
21 Q. As another example, an astrologer predicted a helicopter
22 crash?
23 A. Yes, that's right.
24 Q. If we look at the Mishcon note -- do you still have it?
25 A. No, it has gone.
174
1 Q. You have never had a hard copy? Thank you. If we look
2 at the Mishcon note, second paragraph:
3 "HRH said that she had been informed by reliable
4 sources whom she did not wish to reveal. (They would
5 speedily dry up if she broke her promise of
6 confidentiality) ..."
7 Then we have the predictions, that the Queen will
8 abdicate in April; Prince Charles will assume the
9 throne; efforts would be made to get rid of her;
10 accident in her car, such as pre-prepared brake failure;
11 conspiracy that she and Camilla would be put aside; and
12 that Prince Charles would marry Miss Legge-Bourke.
13 Now, in your witness statement, Mr Jephson, you said
14 this -- do you have it with you?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. It's towards the bottom of the first page:
17 "I should explain that in the circumstances, though
18 I thought it highly unlikely that they were well-founded
19 [these are the fears expressed in the Mishcon note],
20 I was anxious not to dismiss these claims outright. The
21 Princess had made similar claims to me in the recent
22 past without any evidence being found. There were no
23 reliable witnesses. Nevertheless, I knew that an open
24 expression of disbelief might discourage her from
25 sharing similar fears in future. I felt it best to try
175
1 to elicit the source of her information in order to
2 decide what credence it deserved. However, in the time
3 available I was not able to establish the source with
4 any certainty and even wondered if one existed at all.
5 Knowing her as I did, I was fairly confident that her
6 reactions were not those of someone who actually feared
7 for their life."
8 Mr Jephson, I have no desire, let alone intention,
9 to be uncharitable or unfair to the Princess, but would
10 you not agree that when the Princess made statements
11 based on information that she had from "sources", one
12 should be wary as to the nature of the source?
13 A. I think that's evident from my statement.
14 Q. And one should be wary as to whether or not the source
15 actually existed?
16 A. That also you could infer from my statement.
17 MR HORWELL: Thank you, Mr Jephson.
18 MR MANSFIELD: I wonder if I may just make an observation?
19 I wonder if Mr Horwell would be careful about what he
20 says he knows about the sources that have been
21 established.
22 MR HORWELL: Based on evidence, sir, that we have heard.
23 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Hough?
24 Further questions from MR HOUGH
25 MR HOUGH: One very quick point, Mr Jephson.
176
1 I don't know if you know this, but after both the
2 Camillagate and the Squidgygate tapes were published,
3 the Prime Minister -- it's recorded in Hansard for
4 20th January 1993, column 268, and this can be made
5 available on Lextranet and on the website -- made
6 a statement in Parliament in which he said this:
7 "As my right honourable Friend the Secretary of
8 State for National Heritage assured the House in his
9 statement on 14 January, there is no substance to
10 rumours about the involvement of the security and
11 intelligence agencies in interception of the
12 communications of the Royal Family."
13 Mr Jephson, just this: do you now or have you ever
14 had any basis for disbelieving or gainsaying that
15 statement of the Prime Minister?
16 A. No, but could I add also that in giving the advice I did
17 to the Princess about being careful about what she said
18 on the phone, I was thinking as much of casual
19 eavesdroppers as any organised monitoring scheme.
20 MR HOUGH: Of course. Thank you very much.
21 (The witness withdrew)
22 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Could we have hard copies of that
23 made available, please, Mr Hough, for the jury bundle
24 and for me as well as anybody else?
25 MR HOUGH: Yes.
177
1 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Members of the jury, then we
2 break off. Thank you very much for sitting later than
3 usual tonight. We resume at 10 o'clock on Monday.
4 (5.00 pm)
5 (The court adjourned until 10.00 am on
6 Monday, 28th January 2008)
7
8
178
1 INDEX
2 PAGE
3 MR TREVOR REES (continued) ....................... 1
4
5 Questions from MR CROXFORD ................ 1
6
7 Questions from MR HORWELL ................. 30
8
9 COMMANDER PATRICK JEPHSON (sworn) ................ 53
10
11 Questions from MR HOUGH ................... 53
12
13 Questions from MR MANSFIELD ............... 80
14
15 DR JEAN MARC MARTINO (affirmed) .................. 111
16
17 Questions from MR HOUGH ................... 111
18
19 Questions from MR MANSFIELD ............... 132
20
21 Questions from MR MACLEOD ................. 142
22
23 COMMANDER PATRICK JEPHSON ........................ 146
24 (continued)
25
179
1 Questions from MR MANSFIELD (continued) ... 146
2
3 Questions from MR HORWELL ................. 169
4
5 Further questions from MR HOUGH ........... 176
6
Français