Hearing transcripts

15 January 2008 - Afternoon session
5 (2.05 pm)
6 (Jury out)
7 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Mansfield, on the timetable,
8 both Sir David and Mr Burrell are due to fly to America
9 tomorrow, so it would be a great service to each of them
10 if their evidence could be concluded this afternoon by
11 5 o'clock.
12 MR MANSFIELD: Yes. I can say Sir David is guaranteed, but
13 I am afraid Mr Burrell -- I can't say at the moment.
14 I have quite a lot of material.
15 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I understand that. We will have
16 to see how we go, but I wanted you to know what the
17 position was.
18 MR MANSFIELD: Certainly. I will endeavour to meet that.
19 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you.
20 (2.07 pm)
21 (Jury present)
22 MR MANSFIELD: Could we have on screen, so you know it's the
23 Mishcon note -- it's [INQ0006335] please. Just while
24 arrangements are being made, I can continue asking
25 questions to save time. It's easier if we all have the

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1 document in front of us. I am sorry, I didn't see there
2 wasn't somebody here.
3 Really dealing with the position in September of
4 1997 when the note is brought to you, I just want to go
5 back to that situation. You have agreed that it is
6 potentially relevant to the crash. Now, before
7 developing that, I would just like you to look at the
8 document again, read it, if you need to, to yourself,
9 and then have another shot and how it's relevant and to
10 what it is relevant. (Pause)
11 A. If I may, I would consider it to be potentially relevant
12 to a set of circumstances that were being reported that
13 occurred in 1995, concerning the expressed fears of
14 Diana, Princess of Wales, to her solicitor,
15 Lord Mishcon.
16 Q. Yes. So, I will just repeat it now that it's possible.
17 The number is [INQ0006335]. It's the Mishcon note. The
18 paragraph of particular relevance is the second -- in
19 fact it's the second half of the second paragraph, where
20 it starts with the (b):
21 "... efforts would be made ..."
22 I think that's all legible.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. The jury can see what we are talking about.
25 You see, never mind what happened in Paris. What

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1 she has told her solicitor -- and we heard this morning
2 and I think you did as well that certainly they took it
3 seriously; seriously enough, one, to record it, and
4 those who were present regarded it as serious. You will
5 see here in the next paragraph -- I don't ask for it to
6 be highlighted -- that so concerned was the solicitor
7 that he had a private word with Commander Jephson, her
8 private secretary, who surprisingly said that he himself
9 half-believed in the accuracy of what was being said.
10 Now, what is being laid bare here is the potential
11 of an extremely serious conspiracy with regard to the
12 Royal Family; yes?
13 A. Yes, but tragically, of course, this note comes into our
14 possession after the sad death of Diana, Princess of
15 Wales.
16 Q. Yes. That doesn't make any difference, does it?
17 A. Well, it means that the lead inquiry into this matter,
18 given those tragic events, rests with the French
19 authorities.
20 Q. No, I am so sorry. You are not following me. Leave
21 aside the crash. What you are being told here, unless
22 you didn't want to hear it then or now -- what you were
23 being told was: there was a conspiracy to do serious
24 injury, at its least, to a member of the Royal Family,
25 then, back in 1995; yes?

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1 A. No. I have a different interpretation, and it --
2 I don't think one can, in all logic, put aside the fact
3 that the tragic crash had occurred. That meant that
4 there was an investigation which had been mounted
5 entirely properly by the French authorities.
6 Q. Yes, I am sorry, it may be me being very, very slow.
7 I am trying to stand back, be objective, be a police
8 officer. Yes? All right? That series of statements.
9 Your position has been that this note wasn't going
10 to go anywhere because it was just an accident in
11 France, and until it wasn't an accident in France, it
12 wasn't going to go anywhere. Pretty well that was the
13 position in September?
14 A. I think that is indicating that we are treating this
15 other than seriously because clearly we were keeping
16 this matter under review. As soon as material emerged
17 which made that material pertinent, we then disclosed --
18 brought this to notice.
19 Q. I will have to come back to the legitimacy of that
20 approach.
21 What you are being told -- and so that again
22 everyone is clear, there is no time limit, is there, in
23 crime?
24 A. No, no.
25 Q. So whenever -- and we hear cases regularly; DNA

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1 discloses a culprit of a murder 30 years ago. The
2 passage of time doesn't make any difference if there was
3 a crime committed, does it? It makes it more difficult
4 to investigate, but that's the limit of it?
5 A. No, but in this case tragically there had been
6 an intervening event before we saw this document.
7 Q. It doesn't alter the fact of a conspiracy in 1995
8 because you are not linking this to what happened in
9 Paris until there is something suspicious. You have
10 here freestanding material, and in fact, lest you should
11 not understand, Her Royal Highness has actually spelt it
12 out. Let us just deal with (b). I am sorry, I am
13 suggesting to you it's extremely serious.
14 " ... (b) efforts would be made if not to get rid of
15 her (be it by some accident in her car such as
16 pre-prepared brake failure or whatever) between now and
17 then [then was a date that by this time had already
18 passed], then at least to see that she was so injured or
19 damaged as to be declared 'unbalanced'. She was
20 convinced that there was a conspiracy and that she and
21 Camilla were to be 'put aside'."
22 Then she mentions Miss Legge-Bourke and so on. Then
23 there is the paragraph dealing with Jephson.
24 A conspiracy doesn't have to come to fruition for
25 a criminal charge, does it?

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1 A. By definition.
2 Q. So if you were to uncover a plot at the heart of our
3 State to do away with or seriously injure a member of
4 the Royal Family, that would be extremely serious,
5 wouldn't it?
6 A. It would.
7 Q. Are you saying this never even occurred to you?
8 A. No. I am suggesting that the consensus view, given the
9 tragic circumstances that had occurred, was to deal with
10 this note in the way that I have described.
11 Q. Are you saying -- and I am sorry to persist in it; it
12 doesn't appear in the record of the meeting -- on that
13 day or thereafter that anybody considered the
14 freestanding effect of what she was saying, which was
15 prima facie there appears to have been, in her view from
16 the materials she had gleaned from reliable sources,
17 a plot; right?
18 A. Clearly that was what she was saying.
19 Q. Yes, and what I have been saying to you from the
20 beginning of the questioning today is that every time
21 she raises something, nobody does anything about it, do
22 they?
23 A. We don't know that. I don't know that for certain
24 because I have drawn attention to the fact that you have
25 referred to certain material which is not directly

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1 within my knowledge where inquiries -- I don't know --
2 may have been pursued.
3 Q. Where is any record in relation to this meeting, the one
4 in September, that you considered the question of
5 a freestanding conspiracy irrespective of the crash in
6 Paris that needed to be investigated immediately by
7 British authorities?
8 A. We chose the course of engaging with the French
9 investigation --
10 Q. No, please answer the question. Is there any record
11 anywhere that consideration was given to taking the
12 allegation of a conspiracy seriously to be followed up
13 in the United Kingdom, irrespective of the crash in
14 France?
15 A. I am not aware of any such --
16 Q. No. Now, dealing with its potential relevance which you
17 have accepted before lunch to the French Inquiry, the
18 crash namely, do you also recognise that in any
19 investigation, particularly if a crime is involved, the
20 moments or minutes after the discovery of information,
21 in other words the pursuit of information and it's
22 development quickly, is extremely important, isn't it?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. I mean, in a murder inquiry, it's sometimes called the
25 "golden hour". You have to just get on to it

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1 straightaway, haven't you?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Because once people recognise you are out there looking,
4 it is interesting how things evaporate and they are not
5 there to be found.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. You recognise all of this?
8 A. Absolutely.
9 Q. It's very, very basic training, isn't it? So the moment
10 you get this, assuming it's potential relevance which
11 you have agreed, you are not going to want to waste time
12 and sit on it, are you?
13 A. No, in addition to -- I will not repeat the French
14 investigation. There is also an element in which what
15 is being set out here existed within a timeframe because
16 it is apparent that there is a suggestion of events
17 occurring before April. My assumption is that was April
18 of 1996.
19 Q. Yes, I understand that. But of course, if in fact some
20 of the details were wrong, that there was a force at
21 large that wanted to curtail her activities and in fact
22 it wasn't necessarily, as she thought, related to events
23 in 1996 but in 1997, you would have to get on to it
24 pretty fast, wouldn't you?
25 A. If we are talking about the events at large, I do think

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1 that that makes the French investigation relevant.
2 Q. Yes. Because for something to be acted upon that is
3 potentially relevant, you don't need a threshold of
4 suspicion beyond the document itself, do you?
5 A. We chose -- and it was an agreement -- to proceed in the
6 way that I have described.
7 Q. I know you do. I know that's what you say and that's
8 what appears in part of this document. My question
9 was -- and as I mentioned before lunch, please listen to
10 the question -- the question is this: you don't need
11 a threshold of suspicion to investigate or take action
12 upon a potentially relevant piece of information, do
13 you?
14 A. Certainly one needs some grounds for that action. We
15 chose to pursue the course that I have suggested.
16 Q. I know you did, and the question is: why did you choose
17 that one rather than, I suggest, the obvious normal
18 police approach, which is, "We have some information, it
19 might be right, it might not, it might convert into
20 evidence, it might not, but we had better at least take
21 it seriously since everybody else took it seriously" --
22 they took it seriously -- "and do some investigation for
23 the French. We can tell the French we are doing it,
24 confidentially that we are doing this. If it comes to
25 anything, we will giver it to them". That's all

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1 perfectly straightforward, isn't it?
2 A. That is an approach. That is not the approach that we
3 took.
4 Q. I am suggesting that it is the approach, the only
5 approach that makes any sense unless there is another
6 agenda; do you follow?
7 A. Well, at that point I think I must emphasise that
8 placing a sinister interpretation on this course is
9 a mistake.
10 Q. Well, you are entitled to that view, I accept, but I am
11 putting to you very clearly indeed that I suggest that
12 very basic policing steps were not taken.
13 The steps that could easily have been taken then in
14 September -- and if I may put this, this does not
15 require hindsight -- the first thing you would have
16 done, besides Mr Burrell, you contact Mr Jephson and
17 find out why he half-believed. Very straightforward,
18 isn't it; yes?
19 A. Indeed.
20 Q. The successor to Mr Jephson is Mr Gibbins. Contact him,
21 see if he knew anything about it, and all the other many
22 confidants who have come forward and explained the
23 nature of the fears and the basis of the fears and so
24 on, as well as other people present at the original
25 meeting, both of whom gave evidence this morning. All

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1 of that is utterly straightforward, isn't it?
2 A. Yes, and it is certainly an option. We took a different
3 course.
4 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Sir David, was it of any
5 relevance that the Mishcon note was written on
6 31st October 1995, so a year and 10 months had passed
7 between then and the collision in Paris? During that
8 time the Queen hadn't abdicated, Camilla hadn't been put
9 aside and, up until the tragic collision on 31st August,
10 nor had Diana.
11 A. Yes, those were relevant factors. Certainly there had
12 been a period of, as you describe, sir, almost two years
13 before this had been brought to notice. Our
14 interpretation of the note is that it is referring to
15 events between now and then, "now" being October 1995,
16 "then" assumed to be April of 1996, and events are
17 referred to which did not occur. In many ways what is
18 being described here, whilst analogous, is not directly
19 equated with the circumstances as they have developed,
20 tragically.
21 MR MANSFIELD: But of course that's often how information
22 starts, isn't it? In other words, it's not on all
23 fours. You don't ever find a document that spells it
24 all out, that there was a crash planned for Paris and
25 the following people are involved. You never get it

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1 like that, do you?
2 A. That would be unusual.
3 Q. Very unusual?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Of course the document recording your meeting in
6 September doesn't suggest for one minute that you took
7 into account that it was a historic document, does it?
8 A. We do not record that, but that emerges from the face of
9 the document, I think.
10 Q. Oh yes, but if you were taking the learned Coroner's
11 point into account at the time, then you would record,
12 as this is a record of the meeting, that one of the
13 factors that made you put it on the back-burner --
14 agreed between all of you and certainly between two very
15 senior police officers -- was because, "Oh, well, it's
16 in the past and none of the other things have happened
17 so we can assume for the moment that this is not
18 related"?
19 A. Well, I think, to be fair, the note makes it very clear
20 that a very significant event was anticipated --
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. -- which did not occur. So it was in everybody's mind.
23 Punctiliously it may have been wiser, again with the
24 benefit of hindsight, to include those considerations
25 within the note.

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1 Q. Well, they are just not there.
2 One appreciates -- we are not dealing with the end
3 of a case, we are dealing with the seeds in the
4 beginning of a case -- it may go nowhere. You are very
5 familiar with investigations, aren't you?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And the police get a mass of information, don't they?
8 A. Yes indeed.
9 Q. You have to decide what to act on and what not to act
10 on, I appreciate that, but here you have a reliable
11 source, in the sense of Lord Mishcon, you have
12 a reliable informant in the sense that she was taken
13 seriously by her private secretary, at least
14 half-seriously, and by others; yes?
15 A. Yes, indeed.
16 Q. Right. The fact that time has passed -- that's why
17 I started with the freestanding conspiracy -- the fact
18 that time has passed should make no difference at all
19 for a genuine investigation, should it?
20 A. No, and again there was a genuine investigation and it
21 was being conducted by the French authorities, and we
22 had no reason to doubt the determination, thoroughness
23 and professionalism of that investigation.
24 Q. Just so that again the jury get the picture, in
25 September there was a lot of coming and going between

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1 France and Britain in terms of personnel crossing the
2 Channel and information crossing the Channel; is that
3 right?
4 A. Yes, indeed.
5 Q. All sorts of tittle-tattle was finding its way to
6 France; in other words, so you are clear what I am
7 putting, somebody bothered to tell them what was being
8 reported in the newspapers. That was going over to
9 France, wasn't it? It turned out they had already read
10 it. That was going across.
11 A. So I understand.
12 Q. So if we are dealing with a broad spectrum of
13 information that can go across, here you are -- this is
14 not going to cause any real problem -- you just say to
15 Lord Mishcon, "Look, confidentially we will pass it to
16 the French. They may think nothing of it. They may
17 think what we think, in which case they can dump it",
18 but actually they were asking you for information,
19 weren't they?
20 A. It was obviously part of the transactions within the
21 liaison process.
22 Q. You had a Commission Rogatoire coming from France to
23 London.
24 A. I am not aware of the detail, but I would certainly
25 accept that that was a possibility.

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1 Q. And the Commission Rogatoire was asking for specific
2 things as well as asking generally, "Can you help us?",
3 wasn't it?
4 A. I am not aware of the specifics of any particular
5 Commission Rogatoire.
6 Q. No, I appreciate it is some time ago, but that's the
7 normal course of events, isn't it?
8 A. I would be guessing. I don't know whether --
9 Q. I am going to put to you that that was what was coming
10 across to the British police.
11 A. I have no reason to doubt that.
12 Q. Right. Yet despite these requests, despite the comings
13 and goings, not a murmur to the French. Did you consult
14 any higher authorities in the United Kingdom, for
15 example Home Secretary, Lord Chancellor,
16 Attorney General, security services? Did you go to any
17 of them and say, "We have this note, but we are not
18 going to act on it and we are not going to give it to
19 the French"?
20 A. No. We kept the position under review and I monitored
21 those issues on behalf of the Commissioner.
22 Q. I know, you have said that. Did you go to any of those
23 people --
24 A. To make it clear, no, we did not approach any of the
25 persons you mentioned.

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1 Q. Did you not think it prudent that perhaps one of them
2 ought to know, like the Lord Chancellor?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Why not?
5 A. The issue did not arise and I am not aware --
6 Q. No, it may not have arisen. The question is -- why it
7 didn't arise, why it didn't seem prudent -- if this was
8 all a genuine position being adopted, why somebody
9 didn't go and say, "Look, I hope it's all right, but we
10 are not going to take action" -- this is a member of
11 Royal Family -- "we are not going to take action on this
12 at the moment". That's perfectly proper, isn't it, for
13 you to do?
14 A. Yes, but that consideration was not given and
15 therefore --
16 Q. No, the point is the consideration wasn't given. The
17 note of the meeting doesn't indicate any consideration
18 was given to that. If we shift forward, as I did just
19 before lunch, right the way through to October 2003,
20 still nothing had happened, had it?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. In fact the note never was given to the French at any
23 stage, was it?
24 A. Not that I am aware because at that stage the
25 Operation Paget, the British inquiry, had begun.

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1 Q. We will come to the British inquiry in just one second.
2 Is there a sort of action or policy book which shows us
3 all the reviews that you were making of what the French
4 were providing you with so we know the basis on which
5 you reviewed the French investigation and decided not to
6 reveal the note?
7 A. No, there was not. It was the subject of reporting to
8 me by particularly Mr Rees and his successors who were
9 engaged in the case. There is no formal record of
10 formal reviews.
11 Q. So there might have been none?
12 A. Well, I am explaining that it was kept under continual
13 review and, as I was being advised by our officers who
14 were engaged with their French colleagues, there would
15 have been no hesitation on our part if one of our
16 officers had indicated that the French had some
17 suspicion which made this document relevant.
18 Q. All right. Were you told about James Andanson?
19 A. That name means nothing to me.
20 Q. It means nothing to you? You see this was a name
21 apparently, according to the French, provided by
22 Mr Gargan; did you know about that?
23 A. No.
24 Q. So you don't know how he might be relevant to this at
25 all?

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1 A. No.
2 Q. I suggest to you that you really weren't kept very well
3 informed, were you?
4 A. I am certain, and I remain certain, that regardless of
5 the details of the identities of individuals, had there
6 been significant suspicion, indeed suspicion of any ilk,
7 that indicated that the French investigation was
8 disclosing that this was anything other than a tragic
9 vehicle accident, then we would have reviewed this
10 material again.
11 Q. I will come straight to the point, Mr Veness. The
12 French had declared almost a day later that this was all
13 a drunken-driving incident, hadn't they? They had put
14 it out in a press release.
15 A. I do not share that view of the French investigation.
16 Q. That's what they said. They put a press statement out.
17 A. But I do not suggest that that equates with
18 an investigation that is disregarding the range of
19 possibilities. My information was they were being
20 professional, they were being thorough and they had the
21 range of possibilities in their minds as they moved
22 forward.
23 Q. It isn't very common to put the conclusion of
24 an investigation out before you have done the
25 investigation, is it?

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1 A. No, but I am not suggesting -- rather I am -- I would
2 disagree with you that one leaps from that statement to
3 the fact that the French investigation is to be written
4 off as less than painstaking.
5 Q. Moving again onto the period where Mr Burrell publishes
6 his note. What's the difference in 2003, in October, to
7 September -- the learned Coroner asked you an allied
8 question to this -- of 1997? It's the same information,
9 pretty well.
10 A. Yes, it is the similar information, but it is a further
11 indication of the concerns that the Princess of Wales
12 had.
13 Q. If you had investigated it, as I suggest was
14 a straightforward thing to do in 1997, you would have
15 discovered then, in 1997, that quite a lot of people
16 knew about her fears and they weren't all linked to the
17 succession, as it were, that's mapped out in this
18 document. If you had done that, you would have
19 discovered that.
20 A. If we had known of the note that Mr Burrell had, if we
21 had knowledge of that note, it may well be that our
22 decision would have been different in relation to
23 bringing this to notice.
24 Q. You are not seriously saying that a British police
25 investigation depends on having the same information

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1 twice?
2 A. No. I think that's an inaccurate view of the position.
3 There was further indication of the concerns of Diana,
4 Princess of Wales which we acted on.
5 Q. Oh yes, because what I am going to put to you plainly:
6 once Burrell has made it public in the Sunday Mirror, or
7 whichever Mirror it was, that he had this note, you
8 didn't need Lord Mishcon to ring you up immediately and
9 remind you. You must have immediately thought, "Oh my
10 goodness, we have a note very similar but not exactly
11 the same"?
12 A. I would reject the "Oh my goodness" interpretation.
13 This was an additional item of material that we needed
14 to consider and therefore we took the course of action
15 of engaging with Lord Mishcon. As you accurately
16 described, he himself was in touch with us. Together we
17 formed the view that this was now the right moment for
18 this document to be brought to notice.
19 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Was it of any relevance that the
20 Burrell note was in the public domain whereas the
21 Mishcon note wasn't?
22 A. It was a factor that reduced the concerns that had been
23 expressed to us by Lord Mishcon, particularly of
24 needless harm and embarrassment. To a degree, that was
25 now rendered almost academic.

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1 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes.
2 MR MANSFIELD: But it was academic anyway. You only had to
3 ask Lord Mishcon, "Can I give it to the Coroner", and he
4 would have said "yes", wouldn't he?
5 A. I think if we had been able to put before Lord Mishcon
6 reasons for that action, I am sure he would have taken
7 a reasonable view.
8 Q. The reason I suggest that to you is never mind the
9 French, the English coroners, the two of them for the
10 two different jurisdictions, were in fact asking you --
11 well, not you personally, but Mr Rees and Mr Gargan --
12 to conduct all sorts of things themselves, weren't they?
13 A. Yes. They were certainly exploring a variety of
14 avenues, yes.
15 Q. And taking trips around Paris and so on, that sort of
16 thing. We have seen it all.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Yes. Irrespective of the French; correct?
19 A. I think there was still operating, as it were, in tandem
20 because at that stage the French inquiries had not come
21 to conclusion. I do not think at that stage that either
22 of the two learned coroners had come to a judgment that
23 they wished to move from effectively a coroner's officer
24 arrangement where general inquiries were being pursued
25 to a criminal investigation.

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1 Q. We will come to that. But they were actively involved
2 in asking for inquiries to be made from September 1997
3 onwards.
4 A. Yes, indeed.
5 Q. Right. I suggest to you that leaving aside the French,
6 the obligation that you had, which could easily have
7 been cleared with Lord Mishcon, is to say, "We have
8 an obligation to the English coroners to be more
9 precise, the Royal Coroner in particular, to let him see
10 this note, and that obligation arises right here and now
11 on 18th September 1997". Now, that's right, isn't it?
12 A. I don't think so in -- as of that date you are
13 suggesting?
14 Q. Yes, as soon as you got the note -- well, the next day,
15 within a week, you should have sat down with
16 Sir Paul Condon and said, "There is a coroner already
17 seized of this matter". Mr Burton, the Royal Coroner
18 had already taken a number of decisions by the 18th
19 certainly. "We feel we ought to provide him with this
20 note. It can be done on a confidential basis because of
21 course the public ..." In fact, nobody knew about this
22 note until it was broadcast in the Paget Inquiry report
23 in 1996; are you aware of that? Nobody in the public
24 did?
25 A. Indeed.

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1 Q. Mr Mohamed Al Fayed didn't know about it either, did he?
2 A. Not that I am aware of.
3 Q. No. The team that was co-operating with him, and he
4 co-operating with them, never chose to tell him that
5 there was this note from Lord Mishcon despite the
6 Burrell note being in public, had they?
7 A. I am not aware of the detail.
8 Q. All right. I just want to get clear from you what on
9 earth was stopping you from telling the Royal Coroner in
10 September 1997 that you have got this information.
11 A. If we are talking about 1997, at that stage the lead
12 investigation in a criminal sense was unequivocally with
13 the French authorities and the British inquiries were of
14 a general nature. It had not moved to a criminal
15 investigation.
16 Q. No, I already established with you -- please
17 understand -- the coroner's remit is quite different,
18 isn't it?
19 A. The coroner is dealing in the general sense with general
20 inquiries.
21 Q. Yes, of course, and a general inquiry for a coroner
22 preparing for an inquest like this, he needs all the
23 help he can get, and you were going to provide it by
24 liaising with the coroner. It was one of the remits for
25 Mr Rees, wasn't it?

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1 A. Yes, that certainly was an option. I can --
2 Q. I am suggesting to you that it is not just an option,
3 it's an obligation in 1997 to provide, through Mr Rees,
4 this document.
5 A. That is not the course that we took.
6 Q. All I want to know is why you didn't take the course of
7 this obligation in 1997 --
8 A. Because --
9 Q. -- to the coroner?
10 A. -- on the facts as they are recorded, we were looking
11 for the relevant factors, particularly from the French
12 investigation, that would indicate that that was
13 a relevant course.
14 Q. No. It has nothing to do with the English Royal
15 Coroner, who will be looking at things in the round. It
16 may be criminal; it may not. Do you follow?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Right. Now what's the answer?
19 A. Our answer is that we were focused upon the French
20 investigation and we did not see that the course of
21 action would be different as regards the English
22 coroner.
23 Q. Now just moving on from that time in 2003, we still
24 don't have the documents that relate to the phone call
25 and the meeting on the 21st as to exactly what was said

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1 and how it was resolved. Did anybody around that time
2 consider, "We had better now go and speak to Mr Burrell,
3 Mr Jephson ...", and all the other people I have
4 mentioned today?
5 A. Yes, I think one of the conclusions of the meeting, when
6 we reviewed the note, was that inquiries should
7 commence, including Commander Jephson.
8 Q. Well, I have not seen the note so I can't pursue it
9 further than that at the moment. Do you know when they
10 were seen?
11 A. I haven't got the dates of that.
12 Q. You haven't got the dates. What I want to ask you is
13 this. So again the jury can understand, once a coroner
14 has begun, as it were -- opened the inquest and all the
15 rest of it, there is a coroner's officer, usually
16 an ex-police officer, who is assisting; is that right?
17 A. Yes, and de facto the role of the coroner's officer was
18 being assisted by those officers who were engaged with
19 the coroners.
20 Q. From the beginning?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. So this is slightly different. So there is a coroner's
23 officer who, for the purposes of this, involved the
24 squad we have been talking about?
25 A. Absolutely.

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1 Q. So that squad. When we get to January 2004, there is
2 a new development, which is the Paget Inquiry, and terms
3 of reference given to the main Commissioner Stevens.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now that was somewhat unusual, wasn't it?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Whose idea was it?
8 A. I am not privy to the details of those arrangements.
9 Those were between --
10 Q. I want to discover, if you can help, who decided there
11 should be an unusual police inquiry into the allegations
12 made by Mohamed Al Fayed as opposed to the allegations
13 being made by Diana which weren't so dissimilar in some
14 respect? Do you know who took that decision?
15 A. No, I don't.
16 Q. Did you go to any meetings with the coroner in the early
17 days?
18 A. No, I did not.
19 Q. Who was dealing with this side of it?
20 A. In the preparatory stage before Operation Paget --
21 Q. Before the opening of the inquest in January 2004 when
22 it was announced to the world that there would be
23 a Stevens Inquiry into these allegations, who was
24 dealing -- so in other words we are dealing with between
25 October 2003, with the publication of the note, and

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1 January 2004.
2 A. I believe that was Commander Armand.
3 Q. Again, would there be records of these meetings as how
4 this developed into basically an inquiry into
5 Mohamed Al Fayed?
6 A. I think those are issues that I am not privy to and
7 I would not want to guess that -- they are, I think,
8 questions that you might find more helpful to seek
9 answers from Operation Paget.
10 Q. Yes, certainly. We will. Two final matters. You will
11 recall that I asked you about the question of the
12 passport application that had been made and rejected
13 over a number of years in relation to Mohamed Al Fayed.
14 Do you remember?
15 A. Yes, I do.
16 Q. You were interviewed, were you not, by the Fox Inquiry?
17 A. Yes, I was.
18 Q. I want to quote one answer that you made and ask you one
19 question:
20 "... also persons related to the passport inquiry
21 who took a very firm and positive view, who were very
22 emphatic that the Metropolitan Police should be pursuing
23 these matters [namely the ones the jury have heard
24 about] ... and that it was wholly wrong
25 Mr Mohamed Al Fayed should in any way be considered to

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1 be an applicant for a British passport."
2 Do you remember saying that.
3 A. I think it would be helpful to -- yes, I do, but I think
4 it would be fair to put the answer in its context.
5 Q. Well, I certainly can, but it may not need the context
6 because all I want to know is who are the persons --
7 I can read the whole thing. Who are the persons related
8 to the passport inquiry who took a very firm and
9 positive view?
10 A. I think they were well known at the time. There were
11 a variety of expressions -- I think if I may, the
12 context is relevant.
13 Q. Yes.
14 A. This is an investigation that is being conducted by
15 a senior provincial officer in relation to the actions
16 that were taken, I think -- if my memory serves me
17 correctly -- focused upon the safety deposit case and
18 the investigation. The chief officer from outside of
19 London is asking me what my role was in relation to the
20 investigation, and I am explaining to him that I need to
21 keep an overview of various cases, particularly those
22 which achieve some prominence in the public domain.
23 I am then using the example that you have just quoted as
24 such a set of circumstances.
25 Q. Yes, fully understood. The question is: who are the

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1 persons related to the passport inquiry who took this
2 view?
3 A. I am only describing that in the most general terms. It
4 was within my general knowledge that there were
5 expressions of view. As I stated earlier -- entirely
6 accurately, I might say -- I had no involvement in the
7 passport matter and I have no detailed knowledge of that
8 particular --
9 Q. All right. One final matter. When I was describing
10 what happened in the following year, Mohamed Al Fayed
11 was arrested, but in fact he wasn't charged, was he,
12 with anything?
13 A. As I understand it, yes.
14 MR MANSFIELD: Thank you very much.
15 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Keen?
16 Questions from MR KEEN
17 MR KEEN: Good afternoon, Sir David. My name is
18 Richard Keen and I am instructed as counsel on behalf of
19 the parents of the late Henri Paul. If I could ask you
20 just a few questions.
21 During a quite material part of your career, you
22 were Commander of the Royalty and Diplomatic Protection
23 Group?
24 A. That is correct.
25 Q. Did the Royalty and Diplomatic Protection Group ever

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1 monitor the telephone calls to or from members of the
2 Royal Family?
3 A. I have no knowledge of any such activity and it could
4 only occur in a legitimate sense if it was authorised.
5 I can envisage no circumstances in which such
6 authorisation could be in any way possible and I would
7 be amazed if it took place in an unauthorised fashion.
8 Q. So if there was authorised monitoring of the telephone
9 calls to or from members of the Royal Family and it was
10 not the Royalty and Diplomatic Protection Group which
11 was responsible for that, which other service would
12 monitor such calls?
13 A. There are a variety of provisions which have changed
14 over time in relation to the provision of intrusive
15 surveillance, including telephone monitoring. That was
16 previously the interception of the Communication Act.
17 That has been modified with further regulatory and
18 updated procedures. Under those various procedures,
19 there are various authorised agencies. It's a matter of
20 public record of who can conduct those activities on
21 authorisation.
22 Q. Does that include certain security agencies?
23 A. Certainly.
24 Q. Now, can I just come on to one further point that you
25 have covered in a little detail already, Sir David?

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1 It's the Mishcon note. You were asked about whether, if
2 you had approached Lord Mishcon for permission to
3 disclose the note to the coroner, he might have agreed.
4 You concurred with that and said that you thought he
5 would take a reasonable view.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Does it not follow, Sir David, that just as you
8 implicitly acknowledged, the reasonable view was that
9 the note ought to be disclosed?
10 A. I very much understand that a strong case can be
11 advanced, has been advanced this day, for that course of
12 action. I have explained that that was not the
13 judgment. A different course was agreed, which was to
14 subject this note to review in the light of the
15 developments within the French Inquiry and particularly
16 when an additional item of material came to notice, such
17 disclosure in the broadest sense then did occur.
18 Q. But how could the French take account of this note in
19 the context of the development of their inquiry when
20 they never knew of its existence?
21 A. The course, as I have explained, that we pursued in
22 order to address that was that we would keep ourselves
23 up to date with the French Inquiry, and if suspicious
24 factors emerged, then we would immediately review our
25 possession of the note.

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1 Q. Are you saying that having kept yourself up to date with
2 the French Inquiry, no suspicious features ever occurred
3 or were disclosed?
4 A. There was no suspicion, as I am aware, that the French
5 investigation had revealed that this was other than
6 a tragic motor vehicle accident.
7 Q. What about the immediate statements from parties who
8 recalled seeing a dark car blocking the vehicle in which
9 the Princess of Wales eventually suffered the crash?
10 A. I hope I was able to address those -- although let me
11 return to them -- in my answers to Mr Mansfield. Those,
12 so far as I am aware, were not factors that the French
13 had confirmed or corroborated to the extent that this
14 had changed the conclusions that they were drawing in
15 the course of their inquiry.
16 Q. You can only draw conclusions once you have made your
17 investigation.
18 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well we have been down this road,
19 Mr Keen, at great length before the adjournment and we
20 are under some time pressure and it's not very
21 profitable to cover the same territory twice.
22 MR KEEN: Well, I'll seek not to cover the same territory
23 twice, but can I ask you this, Sir David? You said
24 there was a consensus view about not disclosing the
25 Mishcon note to the French authorities who were pursuing

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1 the relevant criminal investigation. Who were the
2 parties to this consensus?
3 A. My comment at that stage on that particular point, those
4 words refer to the consensus that was agreed when
5 Lord Mishcon came to see the Commissioner. It was
6 agreed that we would pursue that course of action and
7 it's described in the note that I prepared of the
8 meeting.
9 Q. So when you refer to a consensus view about not
10 disclosing the Mishcon note to the French authorities,
11 that's a consensus that was arrived at before the crash?
12 A. No, no.
13 Q. Or after the crash and before the investigation?
14 A. Lord Mishcon comes to see us on 18th September, almost
15 three weeks after the tragic crash in Paris. And the
16 agreement, as it was described in this note, is that we
17 will pursue our monitoring of the events. Let me turn
18 to the wording.
19 "It was the Commissioner's view that facts of the
20 accident, so far as ascertained at this occurrence, was
21 purely the result of a tragic set of circumstances.
22 Whenever it would appear there was some suspicious
23 factors, his possession of this memorandum would at once
24 be referred to with contact at a confidential level with
25 Lord Mishcon."

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1 So that's what I am referring to as the consensus or
2 agreement because it was adopted by each one of us.
3 Q. The view being at 18th September, on the part of the
4 Commissioner, that this was an accident not a crash
5 attended by any suspicious circumstances?
6 A. That is correct.
7 MR KEEN: I see. Thank you. I have no further questions,
8 sir.
9 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Croxford.
10 Questions from MR CROXFORD
11 MR CROXFORD: I am not trying to be provocative but I will
12 take a few moments, sir, if I may.
13 Sir David, your decision not to inform the
14 investigating French authorities about the content of
15 the Mishcon note, the tragic events in Paris bore
16 an uncomfortable similarity to the events which the
17 Princess had foreseen or feared when she spoke to her
18 solicitor. We can agree on that, can we not?
19 A. We can. The only caveat I would add is that
20 an interpretation of her comments as expressed to
21 Lord Mishcon gave a time phase with certain key events.
22 Q. An interpretation did, but the critical event looked
23 suspiciously -- sorry, that's not a very helpful word --
24 looked uncomfortably similar: a car crash?
25 A. There was certainly a similarity, yes.

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1 Q. I am not seeking to over-flatter you, Sir David, but at
2 material times, here you were amongst the busiest of the
3 police officers at Scotland Yard, I assume.
4 A. I certainly had an active period.
5 Q. Insofar as you appointed Chief Superintendent Rees to
6 act as the liaison officer with the French
7 investigation, you depended upon that officer to come
8 back to you from time to time and give you succinct
9 reports about how they were getting on?
10 A. Which, to his credit, he did.
11 Q. He didn't tell you at any stage about the detail of the
12 evidence which the French authorities had collected?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. He didn't tell you about the detail such as we have
15 heard today of the blocking car or potential flashing of
16 a bright light immediately before the crash?
17 A. I was of course aware of those in general terms.
18 Q. But, you see, you didn't share the content of the
19 Mishcon note with Chief Superintendent Rees, did you?
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. So he didn't know and therefore wasn't able to take the
22 broad view of whatever information he gleaned from his
23 liaison with the French; correct?
24 A. I don't think that Superintendent Rees needed
25 an instruction from me in order to report to me if there

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1 were any suspicious factors arising out of the French
2 investigation.
3 Q. He didn't know about the content of the Mishcon note and
4 against which to judge the information that he was
5 getting as a result of his liaison with the French;
6 correct?
7 A. That is absolutely correct.
8 Q. Because you only got synopses from Mr Rees, you were not
9 in a position fully to judge whether or not the French
10 should be let in on the secret, were you?
11 A. No, I think I would have been in that position because
12 I have absolutely no doubt that if there were suspicious
13 factors that indicated that this was anything other than
14 a tragic vehicle accident, that that would have been
15 promptly brought to my notice. Indeed you may recall
16 that that was an instruction that I had agreed with
17 Mr Rees when his terms of reference were defined.
18 Q. When did you and Sir Paul Condon, the Commissioner,
19 agree that you would let the Coroner in on the secret?
20 The Coroner was in situ, seized of both of these deaths,
21 when you were told by Lord Mishcon, wasn't he?
22 A. Yes, indeed.
23 Q. Did you and Sir Paul consider the position of the
24 Coroner?
25 A. I hope I have addressed that in some of my answers --

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1 Q. Is the answer "yes"?
2 A. We were primarily focused on the --
3 Q. Is the answer "no" then?
4 A. Clearly it includes the fact that there was a series of
5 inquiries, at this stage of a different nature with the
6 British coroners.
7 Q. Very well. Did you and Sir Paul reach a conclusion
8 about when you would let the Coroner in on the secret?
9 A. When -- and this applies equally to the French
10 investigation -- when relevant factors emerged.
11 Q. Do you mean when, through a third source -- Mr Burrell;
12 it gets into the public domain -- you would then feel
13 compelled to tell the Coroner? Is that what you said
14 back in 1997? Surely not. When were you going to tell
15 the Coroner about your secret?
16 A. As and when suspicious factors emerged.
17 Q. And suspicious factors were the Daily Mirror article,
18 were they?
19 A. No, the relevance of the Daily Mirror article, which we
20 knew for the first time in 2003. We may well have taken
21 a different course if we had known of that material
22 prior to 2003.
23 Q. The last point on this: do you think in the intervening
24 five and half years it might have assisted the coroners,
25 in the discharge of their statutory duties, to be let in

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1 on the secret?
2 A. I have made it very clear that there was more than one
3 course of action that was open at this stage. We chose
4 the course of action that I have described.
5 Q. Very well. You were asked some questions this morning
6 by the coroner's counsel about the untimely and
7 unfortunate death of a police officer, Mr Mannakee. Do
8 you remember that?
9 A. Yes, I do.
10 Q. And that you had appointed one of your officers,
11 a Mr Perry, to enquire into that death?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. You told the jury this morning that Mr Perry reported
14 back to you that it was with the fairly clear conclusion
15 that this appeared to be a regrettable road traffic
16 accident.
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. That report was a report in writing to you, was it?
19 A. I would need to clarify. I think it may well be that he
20 advised me and briefed me on the outcome of his report.
21 Q. But he will have prepared a written report, will he?
22 A. I would need to verify that.
23 Q. Let me take it in stages then. I hope to be more swift.
24 The instruction you gave to him was a formal order
25 within the command structure of the

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1 Metropolitan Police --
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. -- to carry out a formal investigation?
4 A. Review.
5 Q. By way of review?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. In the ordinary course, the conclusion of an
8 investigation by way of review would have been to have
9 prepared a written report; is that right?
10 A. Certainly that would be conventional.
11 Q. Even if, given your -- and I am not being rude --
12 elevated status, you might expect to receive an oral
13 synopsis from the reviewing officer?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. If such a written review was prepared, then it would
16 have been put on file and retained certainly for the
17 period when you had stewardship of your job in
18 Scotland Yard?
19 A. Yes, but I don't know that for a certain fact.
20 MR CROXFORD: I quite understand that. I am grateful for
21 your indulgence, sir.
22 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Horwell?
23 Questions from MR HORWELL
24 MR HORWELL: I have only a few questions, Sir David, to
25 cover; four or five of the topics about which you have

153

1 been asked.
2 You have been asked principally about events from
3 1994 to 2003 and you have told us that throughout that
4 period you were Assistant Commissioner Specialist
5 Operations. Perhaps in these inquests we are looking at
6 a very narrow view of history. Can you help the jury,
7 please, with a summary of your role as Assistant
8 Commissioner Specialist Operations, your areas of
9 responsibility and your principal concerns during that
10 period?
11 A. Yes, indeed. The security protection and
12 counter-terrorism aspects were of particular
13 significance during this period, and if I can refer to
14 the key events that I think might be described as
15 defining my effective agenda in terms of primary focus
16 during this period. In 1994, this country -- indeed
17 this capital -- was afflicted by acts of international
18 terrorism, notably an attack on 26th July 1994 on the
19 Israeli Embassy, followed up by attacks in North London
20 in the early hours of the following morning.
21 Linked to international terrorism were events which
22 were occurring within Paris at the hands of Algerian
23 terrorists, particularly attacks on Metros, markets and
24 places of public gathering in 1995 and 1996, and those
25 same manifestations of international terrorism were

154

1 present here within the United Kingdom. That, of
2 course, as we now know, was to lead to the horrific
3 events of 9/11 in 2001. So I was very much engaged in
4 matters of ensuring a cohesive response within the
5 police service, where I had both London and national
6 duties, in order to co-ordinate that response.
7 Beyond international terrorism, you will recall that
8 there was a ceasefire agreed in the late summer of 1994
9 with the Provisional IRA, which was horrifically broken
10 in February of 1996 in Canary Wharf, here in London, as
11 a result of which we needed to focus enormous endeavours
12 on the resurgence of the Provisional IRA campaign on the
13 mainland.
14 Fortuitously that came to an end when the ceasefire
15 was restored in 1997, but sadly further acts of
16 terrorism at the hands of IRA groups, the Continuity
17 IRA, the Real IRA, continued to cause attacks within
18 London.
19 There were other bombing incidents. You will recall
20 the nail-bomber episode of one particular individual
21 engaged at a range of targets within London. So you are
22 accurate to indicate that this was a time of immense
23 engagement for all of the officers that I was working
24 with and, unavoidably, my focus was on matters of
25 terrorism and prevention of mass murder.

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1 Q. 31st August 1997, you have described how and why you
2 appointed Mr Rees. He has made it clear that he was not
3 sent to France as an investigator, as you have said.
4 The policy documents that have been referred to, the
5 first has been read. Can I read the second to see if
6 this agrees with your view as to his responsibilities in
7 Paris?
8 "To establish liaison with the French authorities
9 through British Embassy in Paris ... most appropriate
10 channel. Our initial communication will stress that we
11 are anxious to assist the French authorities. It is
12 vital that our role is not misunderstood."
13 Can you help a little more as to that, please?
14 A. Yes. We were absolutely clear, in terms of my
15 colleagues and I, that this was an incident, tragic and
16 regrettable, that occurred on French soil, and this
17 needed to be investigated with thoroughness by our
18 French colleagues. Therefore, our role was to assist
19 them as far as we could, both with any relevant British
20 dimensions with inquiries in France, and also any
21 relevant inquiries that needed to be pursued within the
22 United Kingdom to assist our French colleagues. But we
23 were very, very clear that we needed to respect and
24 support the French investigation.
25 Let me stress that we had no doubts in our mind, and

156

1 certainly no concerns were brought to my notice, that
2 this was being pursued other than in a painstaking,
3 professional and thorough way, with due consideration
4 for all of the factors that might have led to this
5 tragic crash.
6 Q. I am sure Mr Mansfield would be the first to concede
7 that he has been highly selective with the evidence that
8 he has summarised from the crash. Were you ever told
9 throughout the currency of the French investigation that
10 the French had reason to believe that these deaths were
11 suspicious?
12 A. No, and that is the vital and important factor. Had
13 that communication been made to me, I am sure I would
14 then have felt it essential to promptly advise the
15 Commissioner, and I have no doubt that on the particular
16 issue of the note, if that judgment and information had
17 reached us, that we would have moved to a position of
18 bringing that note to notice.
19 Q. You knew, of course, that the French had reported that
20 Henri Paul's blood alcohol level was high. Was that
21 a relevant factor?
22 A. I think we were looking at the French investigation in
23 the round. It would be wrong to say, for the purpose of
24 the judgment that I am describing, i.e., disclosure of
25 the note --

157

1 Q. Of course.
2 A. -- that we attached any particular credence.
3 Q. But did that have some relevance --
4 A. Of course.
5 Q. -- in your understanding of the French view that this
6 was not a suspicious death?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Mr Mansfield put to you at one point, "Don't mind what
9 the French are saying" when you answered one of his
10 questions. Did you indeed mind what the French were
11 saying?
12 A. What the French were saying was absolutely vital. They
13 were the professional investigators of this incident.
14 They had infinitely more access to all of the relevant
15 evidence and particularly physical material that would
16 assist them to form a judgment. Their conclusions, in
17 my view, were more important than anything that could be
18 mounted at that stage from a British perspective.
19 Q. You have already been asked about the accuracy of the
20 Mishcon note. You have told us that timing was very
21 important; a report that was made at the end of 1995,
22 30th October, and you were first shown that note in
23 September of 1997.
24 A. That's right.
25 Q. The report was that, from reliable sources, the Queen

158

1 would abdicate by April of what must have been 1996, and
2 that, thereafter, the Prince of Wales would assume the
3 throne, efforts would be made to get rid of Diana by
4 some accident in her car, such as pre-prepared brake
5 failure or whatever. The conspiracy was not only
6 against her, but Camilla, and information about
7 Miss Legge-Bourke. Now a great deal of that, of course,
8 was proved to be wrong. Was that a relevant
9 consideration in terms of what substance you should
10 attach to this note?
11 A. I think both the description of now and then -- because
12 that, I think, indicates a timeframe of activity that
13 the late Princess was referring to, and I do think it's
14 significant that she mentions a series of supposed
15 predicted and anticipated events which, in the event,
16 did not happen.
17 Q. Had you received any information from the French that
18 the Mercedes had been tampered with?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Had you ever received any information that any car
21 connected to Diana had been tampered with?
22 A. Not that I am aware, no.
23 Q. You say in your statement that there were two blocks on
24 using the Mishcon note. The first, there must be some
25 relevant suspicion concerning the death, and, secondly,

159

1 authority must be sought from Lord Mishcon or his firm.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Was one of the reasons, perhaps the reason for the
4 consent being required from Lord Mishcon, what you have
5 described as the pain and hurt that could arise from
6 disclosing the note?
7 A. Unequivocally. It was very clear in my mind at that
8 meeting with Lord Mishcon that he was particularly
9 concerned with the consequences of disclosure of this
10 note. That is why, on that very day, I recorded his
11 concern in a paragraph of the note. I said it was
12 agreed that meanwhile this matter should be treated in
13 the utmost confidence since any leakage could do
14 immeasurable harm and cause needless pain. That was
15 reflecting a view that had been expressed to the
16 Commissioner and I by Lord Mishcon.
17 It also goes to the final paragraph, where it was
18 agreed -- and again I am reflecting a concern expressed
19 by Lord Mishcon -- that these -- the knowledge should be
20 limited to those who were already apprised of this
21 material.
22 Q. Are we to assume that uppermost in the thoughts of
23 Lord Mishcon were the two boys?
24 A. I think undeniably his concern was of the adverse impact
25 this could cause, I think above all, to the royal

160

1 Princes.
2 Q. Was that a concern that you shared?
3 A. I could understand and certainly empathise with his
4 perspective.
5 Q. Now, once the Burrell note had been published on
6 23rd October of 2003, the pain and hurt consideration
7 had disappeared.
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. Was that a relevant consideration, apart from others
10 that you have mentioned, in your then deciding to
11 disclose this note?
12 A. Yes. I think two things: one, the very fact of the
13 Burrell disclosure, if I can describe it in those terms,
14 add an extra dimension, which I think necessitated the
15 conversation with Lord Mishcon. He, I think, took the
16 same view. But very much the issues that had been of
17 concern in 1997 were clearly matters that had now been
18 discussed by 2003.
19 Q. This is the suggestion that is put to you: you knew full
20 well that the security service had been involved in her
21 death. What do you say about that, first of all?
22 A. I regard any suggestion that any element of the British
23 security or intelligence services in any format on the
24 knowledge that I have had any involvement in incidents
25 in Paris at all.

161

1 Q. It follows from that suggestion that it is further
2 suggested that you were a willing participant in
3 a cover-up.
4 A. That is a distressing and reprehensible accusation. (a)
5 I do not believe there was a malevolent act carried out
6 by the security intelligence services to begin with, on
7 the knowledge that I have. If I had knowledge of
8 a criminal act which had been conducted by any element,
9 regardless of whether they were an official agency of
10 the British Government, my duty would be very clear.
11 Q. Did you, at any stage, believe that you had sufficient
12 information, let alone evidence, to conduct
13 an investigation into the claims that Diana had made in
14 the Mishcon note?
15 A. I did not.
16 Q. Namely a conspiracy against her and Camilla?
17 A. No.
18 MR HORWELL: That's all I ask. Thank you.
19 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you very much.
20 Mr Hilliard?
21 MR HILLIARD: There are no questions I wish to ask.
22 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you very much, Sir David.
23 That is all that we require from you. We are very
24 grateful to you for the considerable time that you have
25 given.

162

1 A. Thank you very much.
2 (The witness withdrew)
3 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: We will adjourn now for the
4 quarter-of-an-hour adjournment and then we will resume
5 with Mr Burrell. I will deal in Mr Burrell's presence
6 with the issue of the documents that are being disclosed
7 and matters of that kind when we return to court.
8 MR MANSFIELD: Yes. I was wondering if we might have a few
9 more minutes because there has not been much time for me
10 today to digest. I have no idea what he has brought, if
11 he has brought anything.
12 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I will tell you that when we come
13 back into court and maybe you will not then require the
14 time that you are now asking for. I would prefer to
15 deal with all this in Mr Burrell's presence. If he is
16 here now, I can deal with it before we break, but
17 I think he is not here. He is probably somewhere else
18 in the building.
19 MR MANSFIELD: Yes. Very well.
20 (3.17 pm)
21 (A short break)
22 (3.30 pm)
23 (Jury present)
24 MR PAUL BURRELL (continued)
25 Judge's remarks regarding disclosure

163

1 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Burrell, thank you very much
2 for the documents that you have produced and I am sorry
3 that you have had only, I think, two hours' sleep
4 overnight.
5 Now, together with the documents, you wrote me
6 a letter which is headed "Private and confidential".
7 Now, I don't think it's appropriate for there to be
8 private correspondence between a witness and the
9 Coroner. I have looked very carefully at the letter and
10 I don't think that there is anything in it which, in the
11 event, will cause any embarrassment for me to disclose.
12 I am just going to go through it in broad terms
13 first of all before -- unless I am persuaded
14 otherwise -- I provide a copy to the various interested
15 persons in court.
16 First of all you say that this was everything that
17 you were able to retrieve from Farndon. You invite me
18 to read it, but you would be grateful if I didn't order
19 its disclosure to the Court.
20 I have read the documents. I have caused a list to
21 be made of their description and I have come to the
22 conclusion that there is nothing relevant in any of
23 them. I think the details will mostly be apparent from
24 reading the description of the material. Again, subject
25 to being persuaded otherwise, I am proposing to provide

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1 this list to the interested persons.
2 Secondly, you go into some detail about the notes
3 that you made and the "journal" and so forth, which
4 seems to me to be an explanation or expansion of your
5 evidence so far. That is something which I think that
6 the interested persons ought to have the benefit of
7 seeing.
8 Thirdly, you say that there are other documents
9 which you think include the letter to which reference
10 has been made in relation, I think, to the secret, and
11 that they are in America, and that you are willing to
12 send them to me once you have retrieved them, but you
13 wish to retrieve them personally. I propose to take up
14 your offer in that regard.
15 Then you refer to the secret that you were unwilling
16 to disclose yesterday and indicate that it's not in fact
17 one secret, but two secrets, and you describe them to me
18 in the letter. Having examined the matter, it doesn't
19 seem to me that they are actually secrets at all because
20 both pieces of information are fairly and squarely in
21 the public domain in one way or another. One of them,
22 indeed, appears in your book "The Way We Were".
23 Now, you have expressed concern about revealing
24 these matters and you have also described the difficult
25 balance between, on the one hand, preserving the

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1 Princess's memory and, on the other, making sure that
2 matters that may be relevant are brought into the public
3 domain.
4 First of all, I think these matters are in the
5 public domain, and secondly it seems to me that I have
6 a rather wider perspective of the problem that's been
7 troubling you and you may be looking at it from a rather
8 narrow angle. I am entirely satisfied that, in any
9 event, these matters would be appropriately disclosable.
10 It seems to me that the contents of these "secrets"
11 ought to be made clear to the interested persons and
12 they can achieve that from reading this letter.
13 Finally you say you came here voluntarily, with no
14 legal representation and to help the Court, and if
15 I feel that you need legal representation, then you
16 would arrange it, but it would take some time.
17 It is, of course, entirely a matter for you to seek
18 legal representation, but you may think that it's not
19 something that is necessary in the light of what I have
20 now explained to you.
21 Finally -- and this is really not directed at you so
22 much -- a statement has been provided by Mr Dennis, and
23 it seems to me that that ought to be circulated and
24 available before cross-examination continues and
25 I propose that that should be done.

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1 Do you have any comments to make on that or are you
2 content for me to proceed in the way I am suggesting?
3 A. I am content, my Lord.
4 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: The material provided, I will
5 briefly read it out: one is an A4-paper spiral notebook,
6 which is a general history of servants and what they do,
7 and there are no references to the Princess of Wales.
8 Second is a lavender hard-cover spiral-bound
9 notebook written after the Princess of Wales' death,
10 containing notes on personalities and events for
11 purposes of inclusion in your book.
12 The third is a single sleeve containing about six
13 letters, all written by the Princess of Wales, one being
14 a note of a meeting with Mother Teresa, three others
15 being envelope notes to you and three or so further
16 notes to you.
17 Then there is a box containing about 100 sheets of
18 photographs of holidays with the family and with royals.
19 Then there is a copy of a book on psychology. Then,
20 finally, about 10 pages of A4-typed text with
21 handwritten annotations, headed "Leading men", and this
22 appears to be earlier drafts of sections of "The Way We
23 Were" that, as far as I can see, adds nothing to the
24 inquiry.
25 So I will now make available, first of all, copies

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1 of Mr Burrell's letter; secondly, the index of the
2 documents which I have here; and thirdly, what I think
3 may be the only copy in court of Mr Dennis' statement,
4 so that can be copied. (Handed)
5 Does anybody want to make any observations about
6 that at this juncture?
7 MR MANSFIELD: Sir, if I may, yes. There seems to be
8 an amount -- I will not describe it greater -- of
9 material, and it may be that what it doesn't disclose is
10 more important than what it does, but I would be
11 grateful, before asking any more questions, in the light
12 of answers that he gave yesterday, to have
13 an opportunity to do a little more than merely, as it
14 were, have a glance-over what we have so far been told.
15 May I also say, so that it's clear to the witness
16 and to yourself, sir, I am appreciative of the time
17 restraints, but I am afraid there is no way in which,
18 even if I started now, without any time adjournment,
19 I could finish today because you will appreciate there
20 are a number of major topics that I have yet to touch
21 upon, one of which has been discussed today with the
22 other witnesses, and therefore, in any event, provided
23 the witness is willing, I am afraid it would have to be
24 completed tomorrow, if his flight can be delayed, or on
25 some other date convenient to everyone. But I thought

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1 I ought to make that plain now. I certainly would
2 appreciate some time just to look at this.
3 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes. I think obviously you must
4 have some time. How long do you think you will need?
5 MR MANSFIELD: I have not seen the list yet, but I think in
6 normal circumstances I would ask certainly for
7 20 minutes just to go through this.
8 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: That's perfectly reasonable. If
9 you need more, we will have to give you more.
10 MR MANSFIELD: Thank you very much.
11 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Now, what is the position? Do we
12 have any up-to-date information, Mr Burnett, about
13 Mr Burrell's flight? I know I did ask the Solicitor to
14 the Inquests to make some inquiries about this, but
15 I don't think he is in court at the moment. Here he is.
16 I know your flight is due to leave Gatwick I think at
17 quarter to 1 tomorrow, and your wife is with you, is
18 she?
19 A. No, she is not.
20 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: She is not. Now the most
21 practical solution is to arrange for a later flight and
22 conclude your evidence tomorrow. I appreciate that will
23 be very inconvenient to you, but it would be something
24 that would be achieved at no expense to yourself. That
25 seems to me to be highly preferable to trying to arrange

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1 another date. Would that present insurmountable
2 problems?
3 A. No, that's fine, my Lord.
4 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you.
5 MR CROXFORD: Before your Lordship rises, can I just take an
6 opportunity to give you something extra to think about
7 over the 20 minutes?
8 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: I hope you are not going to say
9 anything that is going to exacerbate a delicate
10 situation at this juncture, Mr Croxford.
11 MR CROXFORD: I was going to ask, sir, whether you -- or
12 perhaps I will deal with it through your counsel -- have
13 anything more in mind to address the delicate situation.
14 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Well, I think it's probably
15 better if you deal with this at a counsel level in the
16 first instance, and if I then need to come into it,
17 I will deal with it.
18 MR CROXFORD: With respect, sir, you may very well have to.
19 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Yes. We will adjourn until five
20 past 4 or such later time as is necessary.
21 (3.45 pm)
22 (A short break)
23 (4.05 pm)
24 (Jury present)
25 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Mr Burrell, I understand that you

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1 have confirmed with Mr Smith, the Solicitor to the
2 Inquests, that your travel arrangements will be altered
3 and, inconvenient though it is, you will make yourself
4 available here tomorrow to conclude your evidence, and
5 we are very grateful to you for that.
6 I think you are also anxious that I should explain
7 my reference to "delicate situation", and of course you
8 have been summoned to appear here to produce these
9 documents and are doing so under an order of the court,
10 but I think you make it quite clear that you are anxious
11 to do everything that you can to assist the court in
12 this inquiry. Is that the position?
13 A. It is, my Lord.
14 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: Thank you. Yes, Mr Mansfield.
15 MR MANSFIELD: May I thank you for the time.
16 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: You are still on oath,
17 Mr Burrell. I should have said that.
18 A. Yes, my Lord.
19 Questions from MR MANSFIELD (continued)
20 MR MANSFIELD: Mr Burrell, I am afraid, as you have heard,
21 I will not be able to finish tonight, at least by
22 5 o'clock, but whilst it's still, as it were, fresh in
23 our minds, because you were being asked questions
24 yesterday, I just want you to have your "A Royal Duty"
25 book and the letter which I asked you a lot of questions

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1 about. I am sorry the jury don't have it. I will not
2 re-read the whole of it. It's on the last page. You
3 interpreted it as a written farewell. Do you remember?
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. We asked about dates, we have been over all the
6 background. It says:
7 "Dear Paul, clearly from your third eye, this coming
8 weekend is an important one. I know that too and
9 I wanted to write on paper how enormously touched I am
10 that you share this excitement with me as well. What
11 a secret."
12 So that's where she writes about a secret. Do you
13 see that?
14 A. Yes, I do, sir.
15 Q. I really want your help, if you can give it.
16 A. I will try.
17 Q. If you can't give it, will you kindly say so?
18 A. I will.
19 Q. You will not make up anything or put anything just off
20 the top of your head, will you?
21 A. I will not, sir.
22 Q. No. With regard to that, I want to take carefully,
23 first of all, as to how you put it yesterday when
24 I asked you these questions as this is an important
25 letter which you agree is likely to have been written

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1 towards the end of August.
2 A. It is possible.
3 Q. Likely?
4 A. It is possible.
5 Q. I will not trouble with the dates. Apparently we are
6 going to see this letter. Did you know yesterday that
7 it was in the United States of America?
8 A. I did not know exactly of its whereabouts, sir.
9 Q. You see, you were being asked yesterday about where
10 material was, and you never hinted at any stage -- you
11 remember the learned Coroner said, "Well it's in the
12 United Kingdom". You never suggested anything --
13 A. I thought it was.
14 Q. Did you?
15 A. Yes, I thought it was.
16 Q. When did it go to America?
17 A. I have no idea, sir, but it is not in Farndon. It is
18 not with my other letters that the Princess wrote to me,
19 so it must be in America.
20 Q. Must it?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Anything else in America before we go too far? We have
23 24 hours. It just might be possible to get things from
24 America. Anything else in America relevant to the
25 issues that you have been asked about?

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1 A. I don't think there is, sir, but I will check when I go
2 to America and I will make sure that his Lordship gets
3 them as soon as possible.
4 Q. The letter refers to a weekend and a secret. That's how
5 it starts.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Then I asked you this.
8 This is page 120, sir, if you need to follow.
9 "... you presumably know what this secret is then,
10 do you?
11 "Answer: I know many secrets, sir.
12 "Question: Please, Mr Burrell. It will take ages.
13 We don't have endless time. Did you hear the question?
14 "Answer: I heard the question.
15 "Question: What was it?
16 "Answer: It was nothing to do with Dodi Al Fayed.
17 "Question: What was the question, please?
18 "Answer: 'What was the secret?', and I am not
19 prepared to tell you what that secret is."
20 So you gave no hint in that answer that in fact it
21 might be more than one secret, did you?
22 A. I didn't, but yesterday was a very confusing day.
23 Q. Was it?
24 A. It was. It's not easy sitting up here with the pressure
25 on, with an eminent QC like yourself.

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1 Q. It's very kind of you to say that. I will make a note
2 for later. One does accept -- and I hope I was going
3 relatively slowly yesterday so there wouldn't be.
4 Because we go over this ground, as you will see, pretty
5 carefully.
6 "Question: So you know what the secret was?"
7 And to make it, I hope, a little easier for you,
8 I said "'Yes' or 'no'?"
9 You paused, so I repeated, "'Yes' or 'no'?"
10 Then you said:
11 "Yes, I know what the secret was."
12 Then I ask you to relax, I am not going to put you
13 on trial, you say you felt on trial and so on. Then
14 I returned to the same topic a bit further on at 121,
15 only minutes later.
16 "So does the secret that you have in relation to
17 this letter assist you, if you can remember -- you can
18 remember it as you sit there, can you, what it was?"
19 You probably don't remember what you said, but you
20 said then "It could be one of many".
21 So according to what you have written today, which
22 I will come to in a moment --
23 A. There is a great deal inside my head.
24 Q. Yes, I appreciate, and I was trying to limit it to this
25 letter. It is probably, as far as you are concerned,

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1 one of the most important, as you said, because you put
2 it at the end of your book.
3 So it's not one amongst thousands. It's the letter
4 you chose to write off the book for. Do you follow?
5 I don't mean write it off in a literal sense, finish the
6 book with.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. When you said that it could be one of many, I said:
9 "No, I am sorry. I really don't want you to guess.
10 I do not want you to say 'I have a lot of secrets and it
11 could be any of them' ..."
12 Then you said:
13 "Okay, I cannot remember what that particular secret
14 was."
15 That's only yesterday.
16 A. It's very confusing being put on the spot to remember
17 a lifetime of memories.
18 Q. Mr Burrell, we all appreciate that. I hope I am going
19 slowly again, not too slowly. You are well able. You
20 have been in the public eye many times, haven't you?
21 A. Yes, I have.
22 Q. Some of it unfortunate in the sense that it is publicity
23 which you didn't want and probably wasn't merited, so
24 I don't go into that --
25 A. But I have never been compelled to reveal things that

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1 I did not want to before.
2 Q. Well, you have taken a lot of trouble to write a couple
3 of books and be interviewed on television.
4 A. But those were loving tributes to someone whom I care
5 a great deal about.
6 Q. This was a letter that you chose to put, as we said
7 yesterday, into the public domain. You could have
8 avoided all this if you kept that letter confidential,
9 couldn't you?
10 A. I agree.
11 Q. Right. Are you planning another book?
12 A. No, I am not.
13 Q. You are not in the middle of any deal at the moment?
14 A. Absolutely not.
15 Q. Or negotiations?
16 A. No. I have no plans to write another book about Diana,
17 Princess of Wales, or any other member of the
18 Royal Family.
19 Q. Right. Then just continuing with what you said
20 yesterday, just on this topic. I put to you:
21 "I mean, this isn't a tease by you, is it, a sort
22 of, 'I'm very close to her, I know lots of secrets but
23 I won't tell'? It's not that kind of thing?
24 "Answer: I didn't write the letter. The Princess
25 did.

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1 "Question: No, by you in the book, because we will
2 come to what you put in the book about this letter.
3 I am sure you remember the last two lines of the book,
4 don't you?
5 "Answer: Yes.
6 "Question: Yes, quite. So if it's not a tease to
7 the public generally and you do remember -- and I ask
8 you again, and you said 'yes' before; now you are saying
9 it's one of a number -- do you remember what this secret
10 was about, a farewell letter as you interpreted it?
11 "Answer: No."
12 A. It's very difficult to pinpoint a particular time and
13 place to a letter that doesn't have a date.
14 Q. This was the farewell letter, according to you. That's
15 how you interpreted it. So it's in August. It's the
16 last letter you have propped up in the pantry before she
17 dies in the crash; yes?
18 A. Yes, it is, but it could be over a matter of time. It
19 wasn't necessarily the last day the Princess was at
20 Kensington Palace.
21 Q. All you had to say yesterday was, "Look, Mr Mansfield,
22 I haven't a clue. I don't remember. I am really
23 confused".
24 A. Well, I am confused.
25 Q. Yes. Why didn't you say yesterday, "I am really

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1 confused and I don't know"?
2 A. Because I should know.
3 Q. Well, we have a document, just provided minutes ago, in
4 which you claim that you do know and you spell them out.
5 A. It can only be one of two incidences.
6 Q. Wait a minute.
7 "In relation to the secret mentioned in the letter,
8 in fact there is more than one secret which is nothing
9 to do with the accident."
10 Leaving aside whether it has anything to do with the
11 accident or crash, is it, as you have stated in this
12 letter, the two so-called secrets that are in this --
13 I call it a "letter". I am sorry. Yes, it is a letter,
14 to the learned Coroner.
15 Is it what's in the document you provided yesterday
16 or is it in some of the answers you provided to me,
17 which is you don't know the secret and it's only
18 a secret you have come down to or you do know the
19 secret? What's the position, Mr Burrell?
20 A. I have had a lot of time to think about that particular
21 question, more time than you gave me yesterday, and it
22 is very difficult to remember everything I did with the
23 Princess and all the things that she told me.
24 Q. Of course, but this is a special letter.
25 A. Yes, it is. All the Princess's letters were special.

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1 This letter I have a problem with this letter because it
2 relates to a weekend.
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. A weekend. If it was towards the end of her life, it
5 would concern one particular gentleman.
6 Q. Dodi?
7 A. Mr Al Fayed, yes.
8 Q. Exactly. It would.
9 A. But, to my knowledge, the Princess never spent a weekend
10 with him. She spent time with him, weeks with him.
11 Q. Paris?
12 A. Paris was a weekend? A whole weekend?
13 Q. Well, half a weekend.
14 A. It was a day, an overnight trip.
15 Q. Oh, that doesn't count?
16 A. I thought that was an overnight trip.
17 Q. I see.
18 A. I didn't think of it as a weekend.
19 Q. All right.
20 A. So I had a particular problem with that, and the only
21 other incident I could think of that the Princess
22 confided in me was another weekend, which was a year
23 earlier.
24 Q. Well, wait a minute. Are we now dealing with a year
25 earlier? Which year are you in, Mr Burrell?

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1 A. I think you are in 1997, but unless I see the letter and
2 the date, I cannot confirm exactly when that letter was
3 written.
4 Q. So this book, "A Royal Duty", contains quite a lot of
5 pure speculation then?
6 A. No, it's first-hand knowledge.
7 Q. I am sorry to go back to it because we really do need to
8 know whether we can rely on anything you say.
9 A. Well, I can tell you the definite truth as soon as
10 I know when this letter was written.
11 Q. You see, the way you definitely put it in the book is
12 not, "I don't know when this letter -- I am so confused.
13 She sent me so many things. It could be 1995, it could
14 be 1996". You say:
15 "The one thing that people cannot take away from me
16 is her final letter to me, left propped up on my desk in
17 my pantry in the month of her death."
18 A. Rather than speculate any more, can I let you know
19 exactly when that letter was written as soon as I return
20 to America and give a copy of that to his Lordship?
21 Q. Oh yes. We await with interest the letter. But I am
22 interested now -- please tell me if you find it too
23 confusing -- when you wrote this in the book that I have
24 just read out, was it true or not?
25 A. Was what true?

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1 Q. The bit I have just read out. I will read it again:
2 "The one thing that people cannot take away from me
3 is her final letter to me, left propped up on my desk in
4 my pantry in the month of her death."
5 A. That's true.
6 Q. So this is it, is it, this letter here?
7 A. I would rather wait and confirm when I have seen the
8 date.
9 Q. Wait a minute. You put it in the book.
10 A. But wouldn't it be wiser to wait and see the date of the
11 letter?
12 Q. No, Mr Burrell, you have had years to think about this,
13 particularly with Mr Dennis, who is probably here today.
14 I don't know.
15 A. I would rather be sure, sir.
16 Q. Yes. Were you sure before you put it in the book?
17 A. I was sure when I saw the letter, yes, when the book was
18 being written.
19 Q. And you had the letter not in America?
20 A. I hope it's in America.
21 Q. No, no, then when you were writing the book, you had the
22 letter right there, did you?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Mr Dennis saw it, did he?
25 A. Yes, he did.

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1 Q. So he would be able to confirm, presumably, as an
2 important letter, whether it has a date and all the rest
3 of it?
4 A. I doubt whether he will remember the date.
5 Q. So you see there is no suggestion here in the book that
6 the letter that I asked you about -- and you have put it
7 in the public domain -- is anything other than a letter
8 from Diana in August of 1997 with a secret, "What
9 a secret", and of course, as you recognise now, if that
10 really was the last letter and it was in October, there
11 is just a risk she is talking about Dodi.
12 A. She could be talking about an accommodation in America.
13 Q. Yes?
14 A. Which was a secret then.
15 Q. Was it?
16 A. Yes. I doubt whether many people knew that the Princess
17 was planning to buy or lease or live in an accommodation
18 in California.
19 Q. She told Mr Kay. Did you know that?
20 A. I didn't know that.
21 Q. No. You see you weren't the only person she talked to.
22 A. Absolutely not.
23 Q. So you didn't know it was a secret, did you?
24 A. I thought it was. That's why it was a secret.
25 Q. So is the secret -- so we can be clear and there is no

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1 secret to the jury -- what you are suggesting in the
2 letter today is that it's more than one secret. One is
3 that she is going to live almost entirely abroad, by
4 which you seem to be suggesting, are you, that that was
5 the United States of America?
6 A. I am suggesting that, yes.
7 Q. But, on the other hand, there is a second secret, which
8 is not United States of America at all; it's
9 South Africa.
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. Difficult to live in two places at the same time?
12 A. There were two different timescales, two different
13 periods. I can't date this letter so I don't know to
14 which incident this letter refers to. There are two
15 different periods of time. One is America, as you well
16 know, California. The Princess took advice also from
17 President and Mrs Clinton at the White House and looked
18 at property in Hyannis Port in Cape Cod, so Los Angeles
19 wasn't the only place that she looked at.
20 Q. Either you know when you write this book and you finish
21 with the line, "Sorry, that's between the butler and the
22 Princess", the secret --
23 A. Well, now I am being compelled to tell you. I have to
24 tell you.
25 Q. When you are asked to reveal what it is --

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1 A. I wish I didn't.
2 Q. -- if I may put it without being impolite to you, you
3 are all over the place. First you say you do know
4 a secret, then you say it could be a number, then you
5 say you don't know. Now you say you do know, but it is
6 two, but actually they are different timescales. Do you
7 follow? I am doing a synopsis of your answers.
8 A. So am I. I am constantly racking my brains to find the
9 right answer.
10 Q. That, if I may put it, is an apt description of so far
11 what you have been saying, racking your brains to find
12 out what you should be saying.
13 A. Not what I should be saying, what the truth is. It's
14 very difficult, 10 years on, to remember everything.
15 Q. I am not asking you that. It's just in the context of
16 the letter. Just one other matter before I turn to
17 another topic. It arose yesterday. After lunch, the
18 learned Coroner asked you some very careful and precise
19 questions, didn't he?
20 A. Could you remind me?
21 Q. Yes, I certainly will. He asked you -- really it was
22 about documents. It's page 108 for those who want to
23 follow:
24 "Now these documents that you have, where are they
25 and is there any reason why I shouldn't do the same with

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1 them [meaning have them here]? Then everybody will no
2 doubt feel that they have had an impartial observer
3 going over them [namely the learned Coroner].
4 "Answer: Well, there are personal letters addressed
5 to me, sir, from the Princess and they are at my home in
6 Cheshire."
7 I have not had time to cross-check it all. You have
8 produced, what, three, is it? Is it slightly more than
9 that?
10 LORD JUSTICE SCOTT BAKER: It was rather more than that.
11 Six, I think.
12 MR MANSFIELD: Yes, very well, six. Sorry. Six letters.
13 So there are six of those. But of course, looking at
14 your book, you must have had many more than that.
15 A. I brought you everything I have.
16 Q. Where are the others?
17 A. Whatever else I have will be in America.
18 Q. Oh, so there are other letters. So we have the Diana
19 letter at the end of the book and other ones in America,
20 have we?
21 A. Whatever isn't in Farndon will be in America.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 A. I presume, because I can't see right now if they are --
24 Q. When were you last in America?
25 A. I was there a week ago.

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1 Q. Right. You knew you were coming to the Inquest?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And you knew you might be asked a few questions about
4 letters and memos?
5 A. I wasn't asked to bring anything with me.
6 Q. No, I am sorry, you knew you might be asked -- given
7 what you have put in the public domain, somebody might
8 just ask you a few questions?
9 A. I didn't know what I would be asked. I thought it would
10 be easier than it is. Quite frankly it's been horrid.
11 It's been quite disgraceful actually.
12 Q. Disgraceful?
13 A. Well, I never thought I would have to be here and be
14 compelled to say what I had to say.
15 Q. You do appreciate that you were the one who wanted this
16 inquest to happen, as I will come to, in your book. You
17 were the one -- is this not right -- that put the
18 "Burrell note", as it has come to be known -- in
19 October 2003, you went out there and put it in the
20 public domain because you were fed up with waiting for
21 an inquest, weren't you, Mr Burrell?
22 A. That's where it should be, in the public domain.
23 Q. How can you possibly say now that you don't like the
24 process you wanted to happen?
25 A. Because I didn't expect it to go to such depths.

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1 Q. Yes, you didn't expect you would have to answer a few
2 questions.
3 A. No, I didn't expect it to be so ghastly and very
4 upsetting.
5 Q. Of course it is, for everyone including the person
6 I represent.
7 A. Yes, and I acknowledged that yesterday. I feel that
8 too.
9 Q. Thank you. Now going on with what you were asked. The
10 learned Coroner said:
11 "Right. Thank you very much. That's half of it.
12 Now what about the journal or the diaries?"
13 "Answer: My journals and diaries, they are intimate
14 and very private and very personal to me, and I
15 personally do not think that there is any connection
16 with the circumstances surrounding the Princess's death
17 involved in those diaries."
18 Now, so you know, you had been the first one to
19 raise the question of a journal in an earlier answer.
20 You mentioned the term. When you gave that answer, are
21 you saying you knew, as you gave us that answer, that
22 there wasn't a journal?
23 A. It was very confusing for me yesterday. I -- it's
24 a rather broad term. A "journal" could be a collection
25 of notes, of letters, or pictures. It could be many

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1 things.
2 Q. But of course you didn't -- even if it was confusing,
3 you didn't say to the learned Coroner at that point, "By
4 the way, they have all been destroyed", did you?
5 A. Well, I found -- when I went to Farndon, I brought you
6 every piece of paper I have, all that relates to my
7 books and the Princess. Reluctantly I brought
8 everything I had and the rest has been destroyed. Would
9 you blame me after what happened to me and who could
10 I trust with what --
11 Q. Oh absolutely. Absolutely. Who could you trust? When
12 it came to the Burrell note, as we see in the epilogue
13 to your book -- since the jury have heard a lot about
14 the Burrell note and the Mishcon note -- who could you
15 trust. Ca